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THE HISTORY, STATUS, AND FUTURE OF TRIBAL SELF-
GOVERNANCE UNDER THE INDIAN SELF-
DETERMINATION AND EDUCATION ASSISTANCE ACT 
Geoffrey D. Strommer & Stephen D. Osborne* 
 
This year marks the 40th anniversary of the Indian Self-Determination 
and Education Assistance Act of 1975 (ISDEAA), a cornerstone of modern 
federal Indian policy.  In 1988, amendments to the ISDEAA created the 
Tribal Self-Governance Demonstration Project. By providing a statutory 
basis for the broader movement of tribal self-governance, this legislation 
recognized and advanced the proposition that Indian tribes can provide 
better governmental services to their own members than can distant federal 
bureaucracies. Expanded and refined in subsequent legislation in 1994 and 
2000, the Self-Governance Policy has proven so successful that today over 
50% of all federal Indian programs are carried out by tribes rather than 
federal agencies. This article reviews the history of the self-governance 
program, identifies challenges to the continued growth of self-governance, 
and discusses possible directions that the program could take in the coming 
years. 
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No right is more sacred to a nation, to a people, than the right to 
freely determine its social, economic, political, and cultural 
future without external interference. The fullest expression of 
this right occurs when a nation freely governs itself. We call the 
exercise of this right Self-Determination. The practice of this 
right is Self-Governance.1 
I. Introduction 
After centuries of federal policies ranging from extermination and 
removal to assimilation and neglect, tribal self-determination has become 
the hallmark of United States Indian policy.2 It is also a human right.3 Like 
other nations and sovereign governments, Indian tribes promote their tribal 
economies, build governmental infrastructures, provide law and order, 
manage tribal natural and cultural resources, meet the healthcare and 
educational needs of their members, and perform other governmental 
functions.4 For the last forty years, the Indian Self-Determination and 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Joe DeLaCruz, quoted in LUMMI SELF-GOVERNANCE COMMC’N & EDUC. PROJECT, 
SELF-GOVERNANCE: A NEW PARTNERSHIP 2 (1995) [hereinafter LUMMI SELF-GOVERNANCE 
MANUAL] (on file with authors). Mr. DeLaCruz, the late Quinault Nation President, is 
acknowledged by many people throughout Indian country as the tribal sage of self-
determination and self-governance.  See, e.g., Tribal Self-Governance: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 109th Cong. 15 (2006) (statement of Ron Allen, Chairman, 
Jamestown S’Klallam Tribe, noting Mr. DeLaCruz’s role in beginning of self-governance 
movement); infra notes 196-97 and accompanying text (describing Mr. DeLaCruz’s role in 
forming alliance of tribal leaders that pushed for self-governance). 
 2. See, e.g., Emma R. Gross, The Origins of Self-Determination Ideology and 
Constitutional Sovereignty, in NATIVE AMERICANS AND THE LAW: NATIVE AMERICAN 
SOVEREIGNTY 125 (John R. Wunder ed., 1996) (discussing the underlying philosophical 
justifications for establishing self-determination as the touchstone of federal Indian policy). 
 3. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2, available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/ 
charter/chapter1.shtml (affirming “the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples”); United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 
61/295, art. 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007), available at http://www.un.org/ 
esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf (“Indigenous peoples have the right to self-
determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”). 
 4. SHARON O’BRIEN, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS 238-54 (1989). The 
inherent sovereignty of tribes has long been a cornerstone of federal Indian law. See, e.g., 
FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (1941) (“[P]owers [of] an Indian 
tribe are not . . . delegated . . . by Congress, but rather [are] inherent powers of a limited 
sovereignty which has never been extinguished.”); S. REP. NO. 100-274, at 3 (1987), 
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2620, 2622 (“The present right of Indian tribes to govern 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2014
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Education Assistance Act of 1975 (ISDEAA or Act)5 has provided the legal 
framework within which tribes can exercise their right to self-determination 
and self-governance, while jump-starting and developing the capacity for 
government-building activities.6  
The ISDEAA gives tribes the right to assume the responsibility, and 
associated funding, to carry out programs, functions, services and activities 
(PFSAs) that the United States government would otherwise be obliged to 
provide to Indians and Alaska Natives. Examples of such services include 
healthcare, education, road construction, and social services.7 Congress 
significantly amended the Act in 1988,8 1994,9 and 2000.10 By tribal and 
federal accounts alike, the self-determination policy embodied in the 
                                                                                                                 
their members and territories flows from a preexisting sovereignty limited, but not abolished, 
by their inclusion within the territorial bounds of the United States.”).   
 5. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-
638, 88 Stat. 2203 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 450–450n, 455–458e, 458aa–
458hh, 458aaa–458aaa-18 (2006)).  
 6. Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, American Indian Self-Determination: The 
Political Economy of a Policy That Works 16-17 (Harvard Kennedy Sch., Faculty Research 
Working Paper Series 1, Paper No. RWP10-043, 2010). For a critical analysis of self-
determination, see George S. Esber, Jr., Shortcomings of the Indian Self-Determination 
Policy, in STATE AND RESERVATION: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY 212 
(George Pierre Castile & Robert L. Bee eds., 1992) [hereinafter STATE AND RESERVATION] 
Esber criticizes the Act because continued federal control through the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs (BIA) is “greater because of Indians’ dependency on the BIA to carry out the 
contracting process that is supposed to more fully involve tribes in the national economy.”  
Id. at 213-14. 
 7. Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 132 S. Ct. 2181, 2186 (2012). In this article, we 
often use “tribes” as a shorthand term that includes “tribal organizations,” which the Act 
defines as tribal governments or organizations controlled, sanctioned, or chartered by tribal 
governments. 25 U.S.C. § 450b(l) (2012). This allows smaller tribes to combine programs 
and resources to produce efficiencies of scale.   
 8. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act Amendments of 1988, 
Pub. L. No. 100-472, 102 Stat. 2285, repealed by Tribal Self-Governance Amendments of 
2000, Pub. L.  No. 106-260, 114 Stat. 711 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 458aaa–458aaa-18); see 
discussion infra Part II.C. 
 9. Tribal Self-Governance Act of 1994 (Indian Self-Determination and Education 
Assistance Act Amendments of 1994), Pub. L. No. 103-413, 108 Stat. 4250 (codified as 
amended at 25 U.S.C. § 458aa–hh (2012)); see discussion infra Part II.D. 
 10. Tribal Self-Governance Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-260, 114 Stat. 711 
(codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 458aaa–458aaa-18 (2012)). The 2000 Amendments also created 
Title VI, which authorizes a feasibility study of including non-IHS agencies in the DHHS for 
a tribal self-governance demonstration project. See discussion infra Part II.E. 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol39/iss1/1
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ISDEAA has been very successful in assisting tribes to develop their local 
economies and build their governmental capacities.11  
Despite the centrality of the ISDEAA to the United States’ policy of 
tribal self-determination, many treatises on federal Indian law virtually 
ignore the Act.12 This article aims to fill that gap by setting forth the history 
and potential future direction of self-determination and self-governance, 
primarily as a statutory directive of the ISDEAA, but also within the 
broader context of tribal-federal relations. Part I briefly recounts the history 
of federal Indian law and policy from colonial times to the present, tracing 
the vacillating policy from isolation to assimilation to termination to self-
determination. Part II examines the history and development of the 
ISDEAA by analyzing the various amendments and enacted titles: (1) Title 
I and self-determination contracts; (2) Title III's self-governance 
demonstration program; (3) Title IV's permanent self-governance program 
in the Department of the Interior (DOI); and (4) Title V, the permanent self-
governance program in the Department of Health and Human Services 
(DHHS).13 Part III examines current challenges and opportunities and 
suggests future directions for expanding and refining the statutory basis of 
tribal self-governance, including expansion of the Act's principles to all 
agencies of the federal government. Despite current political challenges and 
fiscal constraints, we conclude that tribal self-governance will continue to 
expand, benefiting not only Native peoples but all Americans. 
                                                                                                                 
 11. See e.g., Billy Cypress, Chairman, Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida, Prepared 
Statement Before the House Resource Committee (Aug. 3, 1999) (describing self-
determination as “the most successful Indian policy [ever] adopted by the United States”); 
Tribal Self Governance: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 109th Cong. 2 
(2006) (statement of Sen. Lisa Murkowski) (“There is little dispute within Indian country 
that the policy of self-determination . . . is probably one of the best, if not the single best 
thing that this Federal Government has ever done to help our Native people.”); 1 NAT’L 
INDIAN HEALTH BD., TRIBAL PERSPECTIVES ON INDIAN SELF-DETERMINATION AND SELF-
GOVERNANCE IN HEALTH CARE MANAGEMENT 12 (1999) [hereinafter NIHB REPORT] 
(Executive Summary) (summarizing findings of study that even with reduced purchasing 
power of congressional appropriations for Indian health, the growth of tribal management 
under self-determination and self-governance has led to improved health for tribal peoples). 
 12. See, e.g., DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (6th ed. 2011). This 
otherwise excellent 1032-page collection of cases, materials and commentary contains less 
than one full page on the ISDEAA scattered among pages 220, 222, and 333. 
 13. The 2000 amendments enacting Title V also included Title VI, which authorized 
DHHS to study the feasibility of extending self-governance to non-IHS programs and 
agencies within the Department. See infra Part II.E.3 (discussing results of Title VI 
feasibility study and prospects for legislation to implement the study's recommendations). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2014
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II. A Brief History of Federal Indian Law and Policy 
Tribal self-governance, of course, is not new. Tribes governed 
themselves quite well for millennia before European “discovery” and 
conquest. The principles underlying the statutory self-governance programs 
derive from inherent tribal sovereignty and the history of interaction 
between tribal and Euro-American governments. A brief look at the history 
of that interaction helps clarify the basis of the current self-governance law 
and policy and where it may be headed in the future. 
A. Discovery: Early Relations with the Colonists, Treaties, and the Origins 
of Government-to-Government Relations 1776-1826 
At the time of European “discovery” of the New World, many tribes 
possessed sophisticated forms of government,14 as well as expansive 
systems of trade among themselves and with the early colonists.15 Relations 
between the colonists and the Indians were based on the understanding that, 
where possible, Indians desired to remain a distinct people, governing 
themselves on their own lands and on their own terms.16 This much was 
recognized by the United States and formed the backdrop to early federal 
Indian policy.17 
After the Revolutionary War of 1776 and formation of the United States 
Constitution in 1789, the relationship between the United States and tribal 
governments was ambivalent.18 On the one hand, treaties between the 
United States and Indian tribes served as formal recognition of government-
to-government relationships.19 On the other hand, the cultures of the so-
                                                                                                                 
 14. For a discussion of the evolution of traditional tribal governments, see generally 
O’BRIEN, supra note 4. 
 15. See generally WALTER H. MOHR, FEDERAL INDIAN RELATIONS, 1774-88 (1933) 
(recounting the relations between Indian tribes and the early colonists). The 1802 Trade and 
Intercourse Act restricted alienation of Indian-owned lands, Act of Mar. 30, 1802, 2 Stat. 
139, in addition to authorizing the President to “furnish [Indians] with useful domestic 
animals and implements of husbandry, and with goods or money,” id. § 13, 2 Stat. at 143.  
 16. THOMAS R. BERGER, A LONG AND TERRIBLE SHADOW: WHITE VALUES, NATIVE 
RIGHTS IN THE AMERICANS SINCE 1492, at 81–84 (2d ed. 1999) (discussing the impacts of 
Chief Justice John Marshall’s early recognition of Indian sovereignty). 
 17. Id. 
 18. See generally CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW 26–
31 (1987) (discussing this tension in the seminal federal Indian law cases). 
 19. See, e.g., COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 26-33 (Nell Jessup Newton 
et al. eds., LexisNexis 2005) [hereinafter COHEN] (discussing the role of treaties in the 
United States’ policy of establishing government-to-government relationships with Indian 
tribes). 
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called “savages” were seen as inferior to white “civilization,” and thus were 
treated as doomed to disappear.20 As President George Washington put it in 
1783, “the gradual extension of our Settlements will as certainly cause the 
Savage as the Wolf to retire; both being beasts of prey tho' they differ in 
shape.”21 A somewhat later and more benign (though insidious) version of 
this image figured Indians as children of The Great White Father in 
Washington.22  
This paternalism and outright hostility coexisted uneasily with 
recognition of the separate sovereignty of tribes during the time of the 
formation of the United States. In some ways, tribes were analogous to 
states of the union or foreign nations, as the Constitution indicated in 
granting Congress the exclusive power “[t]o regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian 
Tribes.”23 This so-called “Indian Commerce Clause” became, and remains, 
the primary basis of federal authority over tribes.24 The Supreme Court has 
interpreted this clause, in conjunction with the Supremacy Clause,25 to 
mean that Congress has “plenary power” over tribes.26 
                                                                                                                 
 20. See generally BRIAN DIPPIE, THE VANISHING AMERICAN (1982); ROY HARVEY 
PEARCE, SAVAGISM AND CIVILIZATION: A STUDY OF THE INDIAN AND THE AMERICAN MIND 
(1965).  
 21. Letter from George Washington to James Duane (Sept. 7, 1783), in DOCUMENTS OF 
UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 1, 2 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 2d ed. 1990). 
 22. See generally FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN (1984) [hereinafter PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER]. 
Cf. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) (noting, as evidence that 
tribes' relation to the United States resembles that of wards to their guardian, that tribes 
“address the president as their great father”). Tribes did appropriate this paternalistic trope 
with regularity, but more as a canny rhetorical ploy than from a sense of inferiority.  
 23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The apportionment clauses, by excluding “Indians not 
taxed” from the population count for purposes of representation in Congress, also appears to 
recognize the separate political status of tribes. Id. art I, § 2, cl. 3, superseded by id. amend. 
XIV, § 2 (apportioning representation according to population, “excluding Indians not 
taxed”). 
 24. COHEN, supra note 19, at 396-97 (describing Indian commerce clause as “linchpin” 
of federal power over Indian affairs and basis of both historic and modern legislation). 
 25. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 26. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989). The notion that 
Congress has plenary power over tribal nations is in tension, if not outright conflict, with 
democratic doctrines such as popular sovereignty, the rule of law, and the consent of the 
governed. Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 431, 467 (2005). The doctrine is also suspect under international law. See 
supra note 3 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has stated that federal power over 
tribes, while plenary, is not absolute. See United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 109–
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2014
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From the earliest days of the Republic, the federal government has 
recognized a moral as well as legal responsibility toward tribes and their 
members, as evidenced in the Northwest Ordinance of 1789: “The utmost 
good faith shall always be observed towards the Indians; their land and 
property shall never be taken from them without their consent.”27 The gulf 
between such official pronouncements and the actual treatment of tribes 
proved immense, but the pronouncements did serve to establish the federal 
government as the nominal protector of Indian rights.28 With plenary power 
came commensurate moral obligations, at least in theory.29 
Against this backdrop of contradictory and somewhat incoherent 
attitudes, Chief Justice John Marshall authored three landmark United 
States Supreme Court opinions in the 1820s and 1830s that established 
several foundational principles of federal Indian law. 
B. The Marshall Trilogy and the Indian Removal Policy 1826-1887 
Chief Justice Marshall's Indian law trilogy, like many of his other 
landmark decisions, sought to harmonize competing legal, cultural, and 
political traditions. On the one hand, the United States and its predecessor 
colonies had long recognized Indian tribes as governments that exercise 
sovereignty over their respective territories and people.30 On the other hand, 
the ideological justification for dispossessing Indians from their lands 
required that tribes not be seen as the equals of Pennsylvania or France, but 
rather as savage hordes destined to disappear before the advance of 
civilization, as America fulfills its Manifest Destiny to expand across the 
continent.31 The key to understanding Marshall's opinions is that they 
manage to preserve important tribal rights, including tribes' limited 
sovereignty and right to self-governance, while legitimizing what had 
already taken place—the expropriation of Indian lands. 
                                                                                                                 
10 (1935) (plenary power subject to constitutional restrictions and to limitations inhering in 
guardianship role). 
 27. Ch. 8, n.(a), 1 Stat. 50, 52.  
 28. See COHEN, supra note 19, at 419-22 (discussing origins of trust responsibility). 
 29. Id. 
 30. See O’BRIEN, supra note 4, at 50–53 (discussing the early government policy of 
treaty-making and federal regulation of trade and intercourse). 
 31. See, e.g., PEARCE, supra note 20, at 155 (quoting Thomas Jefferson on “the advance 
of civilization” from lawless Indians to semi-barbarous pioneers to pastoral farmers to the 
civilization of the seaport towns); JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 310 (Peter 
Haslett ed., 2d ed. 1967) (1690) (using American Indians as his example of primitive 
peoples who fail to use their lands efficiently, thus giving more advanced (European) 
societies the right to “appropriate” that land). 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol39/iss1/1
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In Johnson v. M'Intosh,32 the question was which of two claimants had 
title to a parcel of land in present-day Illinois: M’Intosh, who had bought it 
from the federal government, or Johnson, who had bought it from the 
Illinois and Piankeshaw Nations.33 In holding for the federal grantee, the 
Supreme Court affirmed the doctrine of discovery: Whichever European (or 
“Christian”) nation “discovers” territory gains “the exclusive right to 
extinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or by 
conquest.”34 Following the Revolutionary War, Great Britain had ceded its 
discovery rights to the United States, giving the United States “clear 
title . . . subject only to the Indian right of occupancy.”35 Thus the tribal 
land grant was invalid; only the United States could extinguish Indian title 
and convey title to an individual.36 The United States did extinguish Indian 
title by purchasing the land from the tribes prior to selling it to M’Intosh.37 
Thus the latter prevailed, and the tribal grantee’s successors in interest were 
out of luck.38   
Although Marshall questions whether the doctrine of discovery accords 
with “natural right,” this question is ultimately moot because the doctrine is 
“indispensable to that system under which the country has been settled . . . 
it may, perhaps, be supported by reason, and certainly cannot be rejected by 
Courts of justice.”39 History trumps natural law—or  rather, the historical 
reality of dispossession creates its own legal justification: might makes 
                                                                                                                 
 32. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). 
 33. Id. at 571-72. 
 34. Id. at 587. For a thorough discussion of the doctrine of discovery, which already had 
a lengthy pedigree in European and American law by Marshall's time, see ROBERT J. 
MILLER, NATIVE AMERICA DISCOVERED AND CONQUERED 9-50 (2006). It should be noted that 
the concepts of “discovery” and “conquest” are wholly repudiated, notwithstanding their 
doctrinal history, by indigenous peoples around the world, including Native Americans. The 
United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues noted that Discovery doctrine “[i]s 
the foundation of the violation of their (Indigenous people’s) human rights.” Special 
Rapporteur of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Preliminary Study of the 
Impact on Indigenous Peoples of the International Legal Construct Known as the Doctrine 
of Discovery, at 1, U.N. Doc. E/C.19/2010/13 (Feb. 4, 2010). 
 35. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 584-85. 
 36. Id. at 593-94. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 604-05. 
 39. Id. at 591-92. Marshall gently mocks the doctrine of discovery even as he upholds it, 
locating the roots of the doctrine in the “extravagant . . . pretension,” id. at 591, of the 
“potentates of the old world,” id. at 573. 
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right.40 To rule for the Indian grantee would have been to undermine title to 
the entire country.41  
Johnson v. M'Intosh legitimized the historical process of conquest and 
colonization,42 but the decision also enshrined important Indian property 
rights and principles of tribal self-governance.  European discovery did not 
extinguish tribal property rights; although the federal government held 
“ultimate title,” tribes retained the right of possession and use.43 This 
“Indian title” derives from the inherent sovereignty of tribes, and can only 
be extinguished by the federal government.44 Johnson, and Marshall's later 
opinion in Worcester v. Georgia, affirmed tribal rights to regulate lands in 
which aboriginal title has not been extinguished, even as to the activities of 
non-Indians.45 Moreover, although tribes could not grant a land title that 
United States courts could recognize, Marshall remarked that tribal 
conveyances would be valid under tribal law—although the tribe could 
convey only the right of occupancy and not fee title.46 Johnson thus 
recognized tribes as separate governments, albeit divested of important 
political and property rights.47 
Marshall laid the groundwork of the trust relationship in the second of 
his trilogy, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.48 The Cherokee Nation sought to 
                                                                                                                 
 40. See also Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 543 (1832) (“But power, war, 
conquest, give rights, which, after possession, are conceded by the world; and which can 
never be controverted by those on whom they descend.”). 
 41. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 579 (noting that “our whole country [has] been 
granted by the crown while in the occupation of the Indians”). 
 42. See, e.g., MILLER, supra note 34, at 50-53; LINDSAY G. ROBERTSON, CONQUEST BY 
LAW: HOW THE DISCOVERY OF AMERICA DISPOSSESSED INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF THEIR 
LANDS 143-44 (2005) (describing “global” influence of Johnson in former English colonies 
such as Canada and Australia). 
 43. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 574; id. at 587. 
 44. See id. at 593; COHEN, supra note 19, at 972-73 (citing cases recognizing and 
protecting original Indian title). 
 45. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 593; Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557 
(1832) (describing tribes as “distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries, 
within which their authority is exclusive”). 
 46. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 593 (stating that a person purchasing land from 
tribes “holds their title under their protection, and subject to their laws”). The tribal-federal 
“split” between aboriginal and “fee” title also evolved into the trust system under which fee 
title to much Indian land is held by the federal government in trust for the use and benefit of 
tribes or individual Indians. COHEN, supra note 19, at 967-68. 
 47. See MILLER, supra note 34, at 52 (stating that the doctrine of discovery divests 
tribes of right to deal commercially and diplomatically with any nation other than discoverer, 
as well as right to freely alienate land). 
 48. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). 
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enjoin Georgia from enforcing state laws on tribal lands; the laws were 
clearly designed to undermine tribal government and seize tribal lands.49 
While expressing sympathy with the Cherokees, Marshall held that the 
court lacked jurisdiction.50 The Constitution allows courts to hear 
controversies between a state and a foreign state,51 but was the Cherokee 
Nation a foreign state? Based on the “numerous treaties” entered into by the 
tribal and federal governments, Marshall concluded that tribes clearly were 
distinct political entities.52 Like their land base, however, their sovereignty 
was limited by treaty cessions and by the historical process of incorporation 
by the United States. In a famous passage, Marshall wrote that tribes were 
not foreign nations but “domestic dependent nations.”53 Tribes were “in a 
state of pupilage” to their civilized tutors.54 “Their relation to the United 
States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.”55 According to Marshall, 
the Constitution grants federal courts jurisdiction over disputes involving 
states and foreign states, but not tribes or “domestic dependent nations,” so 
the Cherokees' remedy was not in the federal courts. 
While Marshall's metaphors strike us today as condescending and 
paternalistic, they articulated a moral and legal responsibility on the part of 
the federal government that would evolve into the enforceable obligations 
of a trustee.56 Much of federal Indian law since Marshall, both statutory and 
case law, has involved the nature and contours of this trust relationship.57  
                                                                                                                 
 49. Id. at 15. For example, the Georgia law prohibited the tribal council from meeting 
and the tribal court from sitting or judging. See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 521–22 
(quoting sections 2 and 3 of Georgia act of December 22, 1830). 
 50. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 20. 
 51. U.S. CONST. art. III § 2, cl. 1. 
 52. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 16. 
 53. Id. at 17. Marshall found support for distinguishing tribes from states of the union 
and foreign nations in the Indian Commerce Clause of the Constitution, discussed above. Id. 
at 18-19. By entrusting Congress with the power to regulate commerce “with foreign 
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes,” the Constitution 
distinguishes three distinct classes of entities. Id.; U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 3. 
 54. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886) (stating that with 
plenary power “there arises the duty of protection”); United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 
226 (1983) (“[I]t naturally follows that the Government should be liable in damages for the 
breach of its fiduciary duties.”). 
 57. See COHEN, supra note 19, at 419–22 (locating roots of trust relationship in the 
Marshall trilogy, and noting that “[n]early every piece of modern legislation dealing with 
Indian tribes contains a statement reaffirming the trust relationship between tribes and the 
federal government”). 
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The third case in Marshall's trilogy involved the relationship between 
tribes and states. In Worcester v. Georgia, several missionaries to the 
Cherokees were convicted of violating a Georgia law prohibiting non-
Indians from residing in Cherokee territory without a license from the 
governor.58 The Supreme Court overturned the convictions on the ground 
that Georgia's laws did not apply in Cherokee territory, even within the 
exterior boundaries of Georgia. Marshall repeatedly affirmed that tribes are 
“distinct, independent political communities,” as recognized by the United 
States' history of making treaties with tribal (as with foreign) 
governments.59 “The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community 
occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which 
the laws of Georgia can have no force . . . .”60 The flip side of the broad 
federal authority over the “ward” by its “guardians” is the correspondingly 
limited authority of states over tribes. Worcester established the general 
rule, still applicable though riddled with exceptions, that states lack 
jurisdiction in Indian territories located within their boundaries.61 
This courageous ruling put the Court on a potential collision course with 
President Jackson and his Indian Removal Policy.62 At the same time 
Marshall was enunciating the United States' responsibilities to its domestic 
dependent Indian nations, the government was bent on isolating its “wards” 
or “pupils” by removing tribes from the settled southern and eastern regions 
of the republic.63 By the early 1800s, it had become clear that tribes in the 
East were neither assimilating completely nor retiring into the wilderness 
with the wolves, as George Washington had predicted.64 To placate states 
chafing at sovereign tribes within their boundaries—and to free up tribal 
lands for white settlement—the federal government pursued a policy of 
removing eastern tribes to territories in the West.65 With the election of 
                                                                                                                 
 58. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 529 (1832).  
 59. Id. at 559. 
 60. Id. at 561. 
 61. Id. Worcester's bright-line rule has evolved into a pre-emption test unique to federal 
Indian law. See, e.g., New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334 (1983) 
(“State jurisdiction is preempted by the operation of federal law if it interferes or is 
incompatible with federal and tribal interests reflected in federal law, unless the state 
interests at stake are sufficient to justify the assertion of state authority.”). 
 62. DIPPIE, supra note 20, at 57-59 (describing Georgia-Cherokee controversy as 
impetus to removal policy). 
 63. Id. at 59-61. 
 64. Id. at 58 (describing Cherokees and other southeastern tribes as “obstacle to 
expansionist ambitions”). 
 65. COHEN, supra note 19, at 48. 
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Andrew Jackson in 1828, this removal policy kicked into high gear, and in 
1830, Congress passed the Indian Removal Act.66 Removal was to be 
voluntary (per the official policy enunciated in the Northwest Ordinance), 
but Jackson made clear that tribes refusing to relocate would lose federal 
protection and be subject to state laws and jurisdiction.67 In the end, those 
who did not move “voluntarily” (generally through fraud or coercion) were 
removed forcibly.68 The Cherokee Trail of Tears is the most infamous of 
the forced marches to the new Indian Territory in Oklahoma; many other 
tribes suffered similar displacements, with consequent loss of life and 
cultural upheaval.69 By the end of the Removal Era, around 1850, most 
tribes had been removed from the East, although factions had escaped 
removal and eventually gained federal recognition and protection.70 
The Cherokee cases represented last-ditch efforts to resist removal. 
Although the Cherokees prevailed in Worcester, their cause was doomed 
politically.71 Nonetheless, the Marshall trilogy established several enduring 
principles of federal Indian law: the inherent sovereignty of tribes; their 
status as separate (though dependent) governments; the federal 
government's exclusive authority over, and consequent responsibility for, 
the “dependent” tribes; and the lack of state power over Indian affairs. 
C. Allotment, Assimilation, and Termination 1887-1970 
Removal was hardly the enduring solution Jackson and his supporters 
envisioned. Within a few decades, rapid westward expansion fueled a 
reversal of Indian policy from isolation to assimilation. First, Congress 
declared the end of formal government-to-government relations by banning 
new treaties in 1871.72 Second, Congress instituted a program of forced 
                                                                                                                 
 66. Act of May 28, 1830, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411. 
 67. COHEN, supra note 19, at 48. 
 68. See PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER, supra note 22, at 214-69. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See, e.g.,  United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 638–46 (1978) (describing history of 
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians); United States v. Wright, 53 F.2d 300, 302-05 (4th 
Cir. 1931) (describing the history of North Carolina Cherokees, now known as the Eastern 
Band of Cherokee Indians of North Carolina). 
 71. See Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee Case: A Study in Law, Politics, and Morality, 
21 STAN. L. REV. 500, 530–31 (1969) (describing how the South Carolina nullification 
controversy of 1832-1833 united Jackson, the Court, and Georgia, rendering Worcester and 
the Cherokees a political “embarrassment”). 
 72. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 544, 566, (codified as amended at 25 
U.S.C. § 71 (2012)) (“[N]o Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States 
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assimilation through the General Allotment Act (Dawes Act) of 1887.73 The 
Dawes Act provided for the breakup of tribally owned reservation lands by 
allotting them to individual Indian owners. Individual ownership, it was 
argued, would speed the “civilization” of Indians by breaking up the old 
communal life and making them individualistic farmers.74 “Surplus” lands, 
or unallotted tribal lands, were ceded or sold off to non-Indian settlers and 
corporations.75 The Indian land base dwindled from 138 million acres in 
1887 to forty-eight million acres by 1934.76 Although the policy of 
allotment was later repudiated, its legacy can still be seen in the high 
parcelization, varying and multiple ownership, and jurisdictional 
“checkerboard” of many reservations.77  
The allotment era saw the rise of federal domination of life on the 
reservations and the corresponding decline in tribal governments; the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) “proliferated as a federal, bureaucratic 
alternative to self-governance.”78 Congress solidified the presence and 
impact of the BIA when it passed the Snyder Act in 1921.79 The Snyder Act 
expanded BIA authority to expend funds for reservation activities such as 
healthcare delivery, education, and employment.80 As Congress later noted 
in explaining the background of the ISDEAA, “[o]fficials of the BIA 
assumed the role of colonial administrators on the reservations and 
administered programs and services on the reservations under a policy 
which later became known as 'paternalism.'“81 
In 1934, Congress repudiated the policy of allotment by passing the 
Indian Reorganization Act (IRA or Wheeler-Howard Act).82 The IRA 
                                                                                                                 
shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom 
the United States may contract by treaty . . . .”). Existing treaties were unaffected. Id. 
 73. General Allotment Act of 1887 (Dawes Act), ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as 
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331–358 (2012)). 
 74. Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 9 (1995). 
 75. Id. at 13–14. 
 76. COHEN, supra note 19, at 79. 
 77. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1980) (stating that tribal 
regulatory jurisdiction generally does not extend to activities of non-members on fee lands 
within reservation); Royster, supra note 74, at 46–49. 
 78. Tadd M. Johnson & James Hamilton, Self-Governance for Indian Tribes: From 
Paternalism to Empowerment, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1251, 1258 (1995).  
 79. Act of Nov. 2, 1921, ch. 114, 42 Stat. 208 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 13–
13e (2012)). 
 80. 25 U.S.C. § 13; COHEN, supra note 19, § 5.03[2].  
 81. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1600 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7775, 7781. 
 82. 48 Pub. L. No. 73-383, Stat. 984–88 (1934) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 
461–479 (2012)).  
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aimed to reverse the erosion of the tribal land base by eliminating allotment 
and authorizing the Secretary to take Indian lands into trust (and thus off 
state and local tax rolls).83 The IRA also attempted to revitalize tribal self-
government by providing for formal adoption of tribal constitutions, tribal 
corporations, and formal tribal membership enrollment procedures.84  
Twenty years later Congress shifted course once again and embarked on 
the Termination Era, during which the United States formally repudiated 
government-to-government relations with over one hundred federally 
recognized Indian tribes, thus ending their federal recognition as tribes.85 
As part of the termination policy, in 1953 Congress passed Public Law 83-
280 (commonly known as P.L. 280),86 whereby the United States ceded 
criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indians to some states, and authorized 
other states to assume jurisdiction over federally recognized tribes within 
their borders. The goal of termination was to end federal supervision and 
control over the Indian “wards,” weaken tribal governments, and assimilate 
                                                                                                                 
 83. 25 U.S.C. § 465; see also Carcieri v. Kempthorne, 497 F.3d 15, (1st Cir. 2007) (en 
banc) (rejecting non-delegation challenge to § 465 and discussing purpose of statute to end 
allotment and assimilation policy), rev'd on other grounds, Carcieri v. Salazar, 129 S. Ct. 
1058 (2009). 
 84. 25 U.S.C. § 476. For a discussion of the purposes and implementation of the IRA, 
see COHEN, supra note 19, at 86–87. 
 85. House Concurrent Resolution 108 is often cited as the pivotal Act of Congress that 
terminated the United States' supervisory role and trust responsibility toward many tribes 
and also as Congress's push toward rapid assimilation: 
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That it is 
declared to be the sense of Congress that, at the earliest possible time, all of the 
Indian tribes and the individual members thereof located within the States of 
California, Florida, New York, and Texas, and all of the following named 
Indian tribes and individual members thereof, should be freed from Federal 
supervision and control and from all disabilities and limitations specially 
applicable to Indians. It is further declared to be the sense of Congress that the 
Secretary of the Interior should examine all existing legislation dealing with 
such Indians, and treaties between the Government of the United States and 
such tribe, and report to Congress . . . not late than January 1, 1954, his 
recommendations for such legislation as . . . may be necessary to accomplish 
the purposes of this resolution. 
H.R. Con. Res. 108, 67 Stat. B132, 83d Cong. (Aug. 1, 1953) (enacted). 
 86. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 25 U.S.C. 
§§ 1321–1326, 28 U.S.C. § 1360) (2012)). Under Public Law 280, Congress gave states 
jurisdiction over criminal offenses committed by Indians in Indian country, and also 
transferred certain aspects of civil jurisdiction to states. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a). Public Law 280 
is currently in effect in the states of Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and 
Wisconsin, with important exceptions for certain tribes. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a). 
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individual Indians, often through relocation from reservations to large cities 
such as Los Angeles, Chicago and Minneapolis.87  
D. Self-Determination 1970-Present 
By the 1960s, the termination policy was gradually giving way to 
recognition of Indian tribal rights to self-determination. The Kennedy 
Administration did not seek to terminate any tribes, and, under the 
programs of the Great Society, the Johnson Administration embraced 
Indian tribes through unprecedented investments in Indian social programs 
and reservation infrastructure.88 In 1968, Congress passed the Indian Civil 
Rights Act,89 making many of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights 
applicable to Indian tribes while also expressly favoring tribal rights to self-
determination.90 Also in 1968, President Johnson delivered a special 
message to Congress about “The Forgotten American,”91 the first special 
message devoted solely to Native Americans and federal Indian policy.  
Despite this favorable shift away from termination, President Johnson’s 
definition of self-determination was viewed by some critics as more of a 
paternalistic image than of beneficial substance.92 For many tribes, self-
determination went well beyond the concept envisioned by President 
                                                                                                                 
 87. COHEN, supra note 19, at 91–93. 
 88. See generally THOMAS CLARKIN, FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY IN THE KENNEDY AND 
JOHNSON ADMINISTRATIONS 1961–1969 (2001); VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, 
AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE 22 (1983) (discussing the era of self-determination).  
The Great Society was President Johnson’s term for a series of domestic programs aimed 
primarily at eliminating poverty and racism.   
 89. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA), Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. IV, 82 Stat. 78 
(codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303 (2012)); see TRIBAL TERRITORY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND 
GOVERNANCE 153–55 (John R. Wunder & Cynthia Willis Esqueda eds., 2000) (discussing 
the ICRA and the IRA in the context of federal policy shifting towards self-determination); 
see also NATIVE AMERICANS AND THE LAW: THE INDIAN BILL OF RIGHTS (John R. Wunder 
ed., 1968) [hereinafter INDIAN BILL OF RIGHTS] (analyzing the effects of the ICRA and its 
impacts on tribal sovereignty and self-determination). 
 90. See 25 U.S.C. § 1301(1) (defining Indian tribe as a group “recognized as possessing 
powers of self-government”); see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).  
The Court held in Martinez that the ICRA does not subject tribes to the jurisdiction of 
federal courts in civil actions for declaratory or injunctive relief to enforce its provisions. Id.  
Rather, the ICRA manifests a congressional purpose to protect tribal sovereignty from undue 
interference by limiting judicial review in federal courts to review of tribal criminal 
convictions by way of habeas corpus. Id. 
 91. President Johnson, Special Message to Congress on the Problems of the American 
Indian: “The Forgotten American,” 1 PUB. PAPERS 336–37, 343–44 (Mar. 6, 1968).  
 92. See, e.g., S. LYMAN TYLER, A HISTORY OF INDIAN POLICY 200–14 (1973) (discussing 
the origins of self-determination). 
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Johnson and included legal and political sovereignty, fulfillment of treaty 
obligations, the return and protection of homelands, and the continued 
maintenance of the United States’ trust responsibilities.93 In 1970, President 
Nixon largely embraced this vision and ushered in a new era of federal 
Indian policy, calling for self-determination for all Indian tribes.94 
Recognizing that the Termination Era was a disaster for tribal governments 
throughout Indian country, President Nixon urged the abolition of 
termination and its corrosive effects on tribal communities: 
Because termination is morally and legally unacceptable, 
because it produces bad practical results, and because the mere 
threat of termination tends to discourage self-sufficiency among 
Indian groups, I am asking the Congress to pass a new 
Concurrent Resolution which would expressly renounce, 
repudiate and repeal the termination policy. . . . [S]elf-
determination among the Indian people can and must be 
encouraged without the threat of eventual termination. In my 
view, in fact, that is the only way that self-determination can be 
effectively fostered.95 
Although Congress retained its plenary control over Indian affairs,96 
President Nixon recognized that federal bureaucracies had largely failed 
Indian peoples, and that the time had come for a fresh approach. “Indians 
will get better programs and that public monies will be more effectively 
expended if the people who are most affected by these programs are 
responsible for operating them.”97 
To the surprise of many observers in Indian country, President Nixon 
resolved to define self-determination specifically and to make self-
determination the official federal Indian policy.98 The President proposed a 
                                                                                                                 
 93. Id. Some tribal leaders even argued that self-determination required strong tribal 
independence separate from the United States, rather than having the United States supervise 
limited economic development. Id. at 160. 
 94. PRESIDENT NIXON’S MESSAGE TO CONGRESS TRANSMITTING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
INDIAN POLICY, H.R. DOC. NO. 91-363, at 3 (1970) [hereinafter NIXON’S MESSAGE TO 
CONGRESS].   
 95. Id. 
 96. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 97. NIXON’S MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, supra note 94. 
 98. INDIAN BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 89. Louis R. Bruce, a Mohawk-Sioux from Pine 
Ridge and Nixon’s Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and LaDonna Harris, a Comanche and 
the wife of Senator Fred Harris (D-Okla.), were instrumental in crafting Nixon’s message to 
Congress. Id.  
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legislative package designed to expedite transfer of the administration of 
federal programs that benefit Indian people to Indian tribal governments. It 
took Congress nearly five years to respond, but ultimately it passed the 
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975.99 This 
Act reflects congressional acceptance of tribal autonomy and the failure of 
termination policies.100  
III. The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act 
The ISDEAA is largely concerned with strengthening tribal governments 
and tribal organizations on Indian reservations by emphasizing tribal 
administration of federal Indian programs, services, functions, and 
activities, as well as associated funds.101 The Act currently consists of five 
major sections: (1) a self-determination contracting program within the BIA 
and the Indian Health Service (IHS) under Title I;102 (2) education 
assistance programs under Title II;103 (3) a permanent self-governance 
program within the DOI for both BIA and non-BIA programs under Title 
IV;104 (4) a permanent self-governance program within the DHHS under 
Title V;105 and (5) a feasibility study for including non-IHS agencies within 
the DHHS in a self-governance demonstration project under Title VI.106 
  
                                                                                                                 
 99. Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 450–450n, 
455–458e, 458aa–458hh, 458aaa–458aaa-18 (2012)). 
 100. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 93-1600 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7775, 
7782 (describing twentieth-century federal Indian policy, including “a brief, though 
disastrous experiment with the so-called ‘termination’ policy”). 
 101. THEODORE W. TAYLOR, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY 161 (1983) (providing an 
overview of the Act and the policy of self-determination). 
 102. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 103. This article will not address this Title in any great depth.  
 104. For example, programs operated for the benefit of Indians because of their status as 
Indians by the Bureau of Reclamation (a non-BIA bureau within the DOI). See discussion 
infra Part II.D. 
 105. In 2000, Congress repealed the self-governance demonstration project under Title 
III and placed it within the permanent self-governance program under Title V. Tribal Self-
Governance Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-260, 114 Stat. 711 (codified at 25 
U.S.C. §§ 458aaa–458aaa-18 (2012)); see also discussion infra Part II.E.  
 106. See discussion infra Part II.E.3. 
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A. Title I and the 1975 Act 
1. Early Models and the Nixon Administration 
The earliest models of self-government and self-determination were 
found in the restoration bills of previously terminated tribes,107 as well as 
through important efforts by the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon 
Administrations, all of which formed the political backdrop to President 
Nixon’s formulation of the self-determination policy.108 In his message to 
Congress, President Nixon noted that the BIA had begun a policy of 
contracting services to tribes for the operation of BIA programs.109 These 
efforts quickly ran up against bureaucratic recalcitrance and a perceived 
lack of legal authority. 
For example, in 1970, the Miccosukee Tribe in southern Florida 
presented a proposal to the BIA to contract for services provided by the 
BIA's Miccosukee Agency, School, and related activities.110 The Associate 
Solicitor for Indian Affairs initially declined the contract proposal based on 
the view that the BIA lacked legal authority to enter into the contract with 
the Tribe.111 After several rounds of negotiations among the Tribe, the 
Solicitor's Office, and the Appropriations Committees of the House and 
Senate, it was determined that the Tribe could create a private corporation 
with which the BIA would have legal authority to contract for services.112 
Nevertheless, at each turn in its negotiation with the BIA, the Miccosukee 
Tribe was confronted with objections to the specific contents of its contract 
proposal, “add[ing] up to an attitude on the part of the federal bureaucracy 
that the existing laws were not designed to facilitate the purchase by the 
Government from an Indian tribe of programs already being performed by 
the Bureau.”113 In short, the experience of the Miccosukee Tribe 
demonstrated that the BIA's efforts to move forward with self-
determination were hampered by existing legal authority. Specific 
legislation was necessary to bring to fruition the emerging concept of self-
determination.  
                                                                                                                 
 107. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 93-572 (1973) (enacted) (repealing the Act Terminating 
Federal Supervision over the Property and Members of the Menominee Indian Tribe of 
Wisconsin, Pub. L. No. 93-197, 87 Stat. 770 (1973)).   
 108. CLARKIN, supra note 88, at 270–72. 
 109. NIXON’S MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, supra note 94.  
 110. S. Bobo Dean, The Consent of the Governed—A New Concept in Indian Affairs?, 48 
N.D. L. REV. 534, 542 (1971).  
 111. Id. at 542-46. 
 112. Id.   
 113. Id. at 546. 
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2. Drafting the Bill  
Despite the power-to-the-Indian-people rhetoric of President Nixon's 
message, the initial self-determination legislation was drafted primarily by 
federal bureaucrats with little input from Indian tribes.114 Perhaps for this 
reason, the legislative proposal received “no noticeable support among 
reservation Indians” and a cold reception from Congress.115  
By 1972, Congress had its own legislation on the table. Senate Bill 3157 
began with the following declaration: “[I]nasmuch as all government 
derives its just powers from the consent of the governed, maximum Indian 
participation in the government of Indian people shall be a national 
goal.”116 Though this bill was flawed and ultimately would not be 
enacted,117 its grounding of tribal self-governance in the fundamental 
democratic principle of “consent of the governed” would animate 
succeeding legislation. 
Five years after Nixon’s address, in 1975, Congress passed the 
ISDEAA.118 The declaration of policy at the head of the statute articulates a 
break with past policy while also recognizing the continuity of self-
determination with the federal government's “unique and continuing 
relationship to the Indian people”:   
(a) The Congress hereby recognizes the obligation of the United 
States to respond to the strong expression of the Indian people 
for self-determination by assuring maximum Indian participation 
in the direction of educational as well as other Federal services 
to Indian communities so as to render such services more 
responsive to the needs and desires of those communities.  
(b) The Congress declares its commitment to the maintenance of 
the Federal Government's unique and continuing relationship 
with, and responsibility to, individual Indian tribes and to the 
Indian people as a whole through the establishment of a 
                                                                                                                 
 114. See, e.g., George S. Esber, Jr., Shortcomings of the Indian Self-Determination 
Policy, in STATE AND RESERVATION, supra note 6, at 212, 214 (criticizing the Act as a “top-
down decision”).  
 115. Dean, supra note 110, at 536. 
 116. S. 3157, 92d Cong. § 1(a)(1).  
 117. For example, there was no provision requiring the Secretary to turn over a program 
upon tribal demand; any such transfer was to be “in his discretion.” Dean, supra note 110, at 
541-42. 
 118. Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (1975) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 450–
450n, 455–458e, 458aa–458hh, 458aaa–458aaa-18 (2012)). 
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meaningful Indian self-determination policy which will permit 
an orderly transition from Federal domination of programs for 
and services to Indians to effective and meaningful participation 
by the Indian people in the planning, conduct, and administration 
of those programs and services.119 
Congress sought to accomplish these goals by giving Indian tribes and 
tribal organizations the right to negotiate agreements with federal agencies 
that have the funding for and responsibilities of operating programs that 
benefit eligible American Indians and Alaska Natives.120 In effect, tribes 
step into the shoes of the federal government by assuming the responsibility 
for operating programs formerly provided by federal agencies.  
After much debate in Congress,121 tribes walked away with their 
principal objective obtained: the ability to identify the programs, services, 
and funding they wanted to assume control over and administer through 
contracts.122 
3. An Overview of Self-Determination Contracts Under Title I 
The intent of the contract theory was to allow tribes to build the capacity 
to better perform essential governmental functions, as well as to improve 
the programs by making them more responsive to local tribal needs. For 
example, tribes operating a healthcare clinic through a self-determination 
contract have more local control, knowledge of need, and flexibility to 
better serve the healthcare needs of tribal members. Programs under local 
tribal administration are more effective than those run by federal agencies 
headquartered many miles away, and at the same time develop leadership 
skills and administrative capacity.123 
Since the Act’s passage in 1975, Title I contracts have provided one of 
the primary mechanisms for Indian tribes to exercise their self-
                                                                                                                 
 119. 25 U.S.C. § 450(a)-(b). 
 120. See H.R. REP. NO. 93-1600, at 1 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7775, 7776 
(describing purpose of bill that became ISDEAA). 
 121. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 93-1600; Dean, supra note 110 (discussing the 
differences between two legislative proposals in the Senate). 
 122. The Act allocated contracts determined by the Indian Priority System (IPS), non-
banded funds, and congressional appropriations. Johnson & Hamilton, supra note 78, at 
1262-63. This was an important victory for the tribes. Id. In the early 1990s, the IPS was 
replaced by the Tribal Budget System, which included the Tribal Priority Allocation (TPA) 
to improve the process of allocating funds to tribes. Id. at 1264 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
INTERIOR, THE INTERIOR BUDGET IN BRIEF FOR F.Y. 1996, at 128 (1995)). 
 123. See generally 25 U.S.C. § 450(a)(1). 
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determination rights by helping tribes to build their governmental capacities 
to serve the local needs of tribal members.124 However, full implementation 
of the principles embodied in Title I has been very difficult to achieve 
because both federal departments responsible for implementing the Act—
the DHHS and the DOI—proved, at best, to be reluctant partners of tribes. 
Federal bureaucrats repeatedly used their discretion to thwart full 
implementation of Congress's intent, leading to a series of amendments.125  
As first enacted, section 106(a) of Public Law 93-638 provided that 
contracts with tribal organizations were in accordance with federal 
contracting laws and regulations, although the Secretary could waive 
provisions in these laws and regulations which he determined were not 
appropriate.126 Thus, self-determination contracts were essentially 
procurement contracts administered by federal contracting officers. The Act 
has since been amended to provide that federal contracting laws and 
regulations do not apply to self-determination contracts unless such laws 
expressly apply to Indian tribes,127 and to add a statutory model 
agreement.128 
Also, as first enacted, section 103(c) of Public Law 93-638 authorized 
the Secretary to require any tribe requesting a contract to obtain adequate 
liability insurance to protect the federal government. Congress subsequently 
brought tribal contractors, compactors, and their employees within the 
coverage of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).129 Since tribal contractors 
stepped into the shoes of the federal agencies, Congress reasoned, it would 
not be fair to tribes or others to allow the agencies to use the self-
determination process as means to divest themselves of potential liability.130  
Title I gives all federally recognized Indian tribes and tribal 
organizations, as defined in the Act,131 the right to contract for programs, 
functions, services, and activities—along with associated funds and 
                                                                                                                 
 124. Johnson & Hamilton, supra note 78, at 1263. 
 125. In 1987 the Senate condemned the “agencies' consistent failures over the past 
decade to administer self-determination contracts in conformity with the law.” S. REP. NO. 
100-274, at 37 (1987), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2620, 2656. 
 126. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-
638, § 106(a), 88 Stat. 2203, 2210. 
 127. 25 U.S.C. § 450j(a)(1). 
 128. Id. § 450l(c). 
 129. Id. § 450f(d); Act of Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-512, § 314, 104 Stat. 1915, 
1959), as amended by Act of Nov. 11, 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-138, § 308, 107 Stat. 1379, 
1416. 
 130. S. REP. NO. 100-274, at 27-28, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2646-47. 
 131. 25 U.S.C. § 450b(e), (l). 
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responsibilities—provided to Indians and Alaska Natives by the DOI or 
DHHS.132 Once a contract proposal has been submitted, the statute imposes 
a strict process and timeline to review the proposal.133 Section 102 of Title I 
of the Act requires the Secretaries to enter into a contract, upon tribal 
request, unless one of five narrowly defined statutory exceptions applies.134  
This section also prescribes the appeal rights for participating tribes.135 If 
the Secretary declines a tribe’s contract proposal, the Secretary must help 
tribes overcome the obstacles that prompted the refusal and afford the tribe 
a right to a hearing on the record.136 The Act also authorizes each Secretary 
to award grants to help participating tribes develop the capability to operate 
programs that they might eventually contract for under section 102.137 Once 
a proposal has been approved, the agencies are required to negotiate and 
award a contract and annual funding agreement (AFA)138 with the Indian 
tribe or tribal organization within a certain timeframe139 calculated in 
accordance with the Act.140 
Title I contracts are unique government-to-government agreements that 
differ significantly from other contracts, grants, or cooperative agreements 
                                                                                                                 
 132. Id. § 450f(a)(1). 
 133. Id. § 450f(a)(2). 
 134. Id. The Secretary may only decline to enter into a proposed contract if:  
 (A) the service to be rendered to the Indian beneficiaries of the particular 
program or function to be contracted will not be satisfactory; 
 (B) adequate protection of trust resources is not assured; 
 (C) the proposed project or function to be contracted for cannot be properly 
completed or maintained by the proposed contract; 
 (D) the amount of funds proposed under the contract is in excess of the 
applicable funding level for the contract, as determined under section 450j-1(a) 
of this title; or 
 (E) the program, function, service, or activity (or portion thereof) that is the 
subject of the proposal is beyond the scope of programs, functions, services, or 
activities covered under paragraph (1) because the proposal includes activities 
that cannot lawfully be carried out by the contractor. 
Id. 
 135. Id. § 450f(b). 
 136. Id. 
 137. See id. § 450(f)(b)(2). 
 138. See id. § 450l. The Act requires that two agreements be negotiated: a contract and an 
AFA. The contract sets forth the general terms of the government-to-government 
relationship that carry forward from year to year, while the AFA identifies on a yearly basis 
the funds and responsibilities that the federal government transfers to the tribal contractor. 
Id. 
 139. Id. § 450f(a)(2). 
 140. See id. § 450j-1. 
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that the United States negotiates with other parties.141 Section 108 of the 
Act sets forth a model agreement containing provisions that must be 
included in all contracts.142 Congress included these mandatory provisions 
in an attempt to strike a balance between promoting tribal self-
determination while maintaining federal oversight over tribal contracts.143 
In addition to the mandatory provisions, the contract can include any other 
provisions agreed to by both parties.144 
The model contract set forth in the Act protects the unique relationship 
between tribes and the United States by ensuring that tribal sovereign 
immunity is not affected by Title I contracts, and that the United States’ 
trust responsibility towards tribes is not terminated, waived, reduced, or 
otherwise affected.145 Title I contracts must include a provision that requires 
tribes that have assumed responsibilities over trust resources of individual 
Indians to provide the same level of service that the United States would 
have provided.146 
Although the DOI and DHHS have general oversight over how tribes 
carry out their responsibilities under Title I contracts, the Act limits agency 
discretion to impose other burdensome requirements. For example, the only 
reporting requirement that participating tribes are required to provide the 
agencies is an annual audit.147 In limited circumstances, the DOI and DHHS 
have the right to take unilateral steps to ensure contractors are carrying out 
agreed-upon responsibilities. For example, the agencies have the right to 
reassume any contracted program if there is a violation of rights or 
endangerment to the health, safety, or welfare of any person, or if a 
contactor mismanages trust funds or lands or interests in such lands.148 The 
agencies also have the right to delay, suspend, or withhold contract 
payments for a period of 30 days if a determination is made that the 
                                                                                                                 
 141. See id. § 450j. The Act specifies that no “Federal contracting or cooperative 
agreement laws (including regulations)” apply to Title I contracts “except to the extent that 
such laws expressly apply to Indian tribes.” Id. § 450 j(a)(1). 
 142. Id. § 450l. 
 143. See S. REP. NO. 103-374, at 11-12 (1994) (discussing intent of model contract 
reporting provision “to eliminate excessive and burdensome reporting requirements”). 
 144. 25 U.S.C. § 450l(a)(2). 
 145. See id. § 450n; see also id. § 450l(c)(d)(1).  
 146. Id. § 450l(c) (4). 
 147. See id. § 450c(f) note (referencing 31 U.S.C. § 7501 et seq.). However, the agencies 
may seek to require additional reports if justified and required under the criteria set forth in 
the statute. Id. § 450c(f)(2). 
 148. Id. § 450m; Contracts Under the Indian Self-Determination and Assistance Act, 25 
C.F.R. §§ 900.240–.256 (2014). 
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contractor has failed to carry out the contract without good cause.149 Where 
unilateral actions are taken, contractors are entitled to appeal rights.150  
Contracting tribes also have the right to propose a redesign of contracted 
programs after they are awarded, to better suit unanticipated local needs.151 
The statute requires the agencies to evaluate redesign proposals under the 
same criteria as new contract proposals.152 Tribes also have the right to 
reallocate awarded funds, provided the reallocation, “would not have an 
adverse effect on the performance of the contract.”153  
Tribes are treated as federal agencies for certain purposes when 
performing responsibilities under a Title I contract including coverage 
under the FTCA,154 the right to access excess and surplus federal 
property,155 and the right to access federal sources of supply.156 These 
provisions reflect the fact that Indian tribes and tribal organizations step 
into the shoes of the federal government when they assume program 
responsibilities under the ISDEAA.157 In contrast, some Title I contract 
provisions reflect the distinction between Indian tribes and the United 
States. For example, participating tribes have the right to impose tribal 
employment preference laws when hiring personnel to carry out contracted 
responsibilities.158 Tribal contractors are also exempt from the Davis-Bacon 
Act, which requires most federal contractors to pay the locally prevailing 
wage rate as determined by the Department of Labor.159  
The Supreme Court has recognized that Title I contracts are as legally 
binding as any other contract: “Congress, in respect to the binding nature of 
a promise, meant to treat alike promises made under the Act and ordinary 
contractual promises (say, those made in procurement contracts).”160 This 
does not mean that ISDEAA contracts are ordinary procurement contracts, 
as Congress made clear in exempting ISDEAA agreements from the 
                                                                                                                 
 149. 25 U.S.C. § 450j-1(l). 
 150. Id. §§ 450m, 450j-1(f)(2); 25 C.F.R. §§ 900.170–.176.  
 151. 25 U.S.C. § 450j(j). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. § 450j-1(o). 
 154. Id. § 450f(c); 25 C.F.R. §§ 900.180–.210. 
 155. 25 U.S.C. § 450j(f); 25 C.F.R. §§ 900.85–106. 
 156. 25 U.S.C. § 450j(f). 
 157. See S. REP. NO. 100-274, at 9 (1987), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2620, 2628 
(“It must be emphasized that tribes are operating federal programs and carrying out federal 
responsibilities when they operate self-determination contracts.”) 
 158. 25 U.S.C. § 450e(c). 
 159. Id. § 450e(a).  
 160. Cherokee Nation v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631, 639 (2005) (emphasis added). 
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Federal Acquisition Regulations.161 Title I contracts are unique 
government-to-government agreements in which “[]the federal 
government's trust responsibility tempers all of the ordinary contract 
rules . . . .”162  
Title I contract provisions thus reflect a delicate balance between 
competing sets of interests: the interest of tribes to pursue self-
determination goals while ensuring that the United States' trust 
responsibility remains intact, and the interest of the United States to pursue 
a policy of tribal self-determination while retaining some control and 
oversight over how responsibilities are carried out by tribal contractors.163  
4. Title I Rulemaking 
The process for developing regulations to fully flesh out and implement 
the Act was a confusing and complex undertaking. As enacted in 1975, the 
Act provided only minimal legal authority for the Secretary of the Interior 
to develop rules.164 The first set of Title I regulations were rejected by the 
Tribes as unworkable; the BIA and IHS retained far too much control over 
tribal contracts and provision of services.165 Ironically, an early report by 
the Government Accounting Office (GAO) concluded just the opposite—
that the United States retained inadequate controls over contracts and grants 
                                                                                                                 
 161. See 25 U.S.C. § 450j(a)(1) (2012) (stating that contracts “shall not be subject to 
Federal contracting or cooperative agreement laws (including any regulations), except to the 
extent that such laws expressly apply to Indian tribes”); S. REP. NO. 100-274, at 29, 
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2648 (stating the intent of amendment to § 450j(a) is that 
“the system of federal acquisition regulations contained in Title 41 and Title 48 of the Code 
of Federal Regulations shall not apply to Indian self-determination contracts”); see also 25 
U.S.C. § 450b(j) (providing, in definition of “self-determination contract,” that “no 
contract . . . shall be construed to be a procurement contract . . .”); S. REP. NO. 100-274, at 
18, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2637 (stating that the definition of “self-determination 
contract” makes clear that “the system of federal acquisition regulations . . .  should not 
apply to self-determination contracts”); Cherokee Nation, 543 U.S. at 640 (recognizing that 
exemption from FAR is designed to reduce bureaucratic burdens on tribes). 
 162. S. REP. NO. 100-274, at 36, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2655. 
 163. Compare 25 U.S.C. § 450a (declaring policy of tribal self-determination) with 25 
U.S.C. § 450c (imposing reporting and audit requirements on tribal contractors). 
 164. See 25 U.S.C. § 450k. 
 165. See Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act Amendments, 61 Fed. 
Reg. 32,482, 32,482 (June 24, 1996) (codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 900 (2012)) (describing 
“extremely critical” reaction of tribes to first draft of rules, completed without tribal input). 
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awarded under the Act.166 These disparate responses illustrate the delicate 
balance attempted by the Act.  
The 1994 Amendments made several important changes to Title I167 in 
response to earlier objections by participating tribes. Based on tribal and 
Congressional reactions to the proposed regulations published in 1994, the 
1994 Amendments added section 107(d)(2) to Title I of the Act.168 This 
section requires that the rulemaking process follow the guidance of the 
Negotiated Rulemaking Act,169 including requiring tribal representation in 
the drafting and promulgation of the regulations.170 Any future revisions to 
the regulations must also follow the guidance of the Negotiated Rulemaking 
Act.171  
After extensive negotiations, the tribal and federal teams reached 
consensus on the language of the vast majority of the regulations, with the 
DOI and DHHS Secretaries deciding four non-consensus issues.172 The 
final rule implementing Title I regulations became effective on August 23, 
1996.173  
B. Title II: Education Assistance 
Since the early days of the republic, the federal government has assumed 
responsibility for educating Indians as part of its program of “civilizing” 
tribes and their citizens.174 These Indian schools were infamous for 
                                                                                                                 
 166. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-116394, STILL NO PROGRESS IN 
IMPLEMENTING CONTROLS OVER CONTRACTS AND GRANTS WITH INDIANS (1981). The report 
criticized the BIA for not taking action recommended by GAO in 1978 to improve controls 
over grants and contracts. The report concluded that contracts and grants should include 
adequate criteria for measuring tribal performance, be submitted and approved before their 
starting dates, and should be adequately supervised. Id. 
 167. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act Amendments of 1994, 
Pub. L. No. 103-413, 108 Stat. 4250 (1994) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 458aa–hh 
(2012)); see discussion infra Part II.D. 
 168. 25 U.S.C. § 450k. 
 169. Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-648, 104 Stat. 4969 (1990) 
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 561–570 (2012)). 
 170. 25 U.S.C. § 450k(d). 
 171. Id. § 450k. 
 172. See Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act Amendments, 61 Fed. 
Reg. 32,482, 32,483 (June 24, 1996) (codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 900 (2012)). 
 173. Id. at 32,482.  
 174. See, e.g., Civilization Fund Act (Act of Mar. 3, 1819), ch. 85, 3 Stat. 516, 516 
(establishing permanent “civilization fund” to provide “against the further decline and final 
extinction of the Indian tribes . . . and for introducing among them the habits and arts of 
civilization”). 
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removing young children from their homes, cutting their hair, punishing 
them for speaking their native languages, and generally attempting to “kill 
the Indian . . . and save the man.”175 Most of the early schools were local 
mission schools, but by the late nineteenth century the focus of Indian 
education had shifted to federal boarding schools so that students could be 
more completely removed from their home cultures and immersed in 
“civilization.”176 Congress continues to recognize the federal trust 
responsibility for the education of Native peoples, though the explicit 
assimilationist goal of Indian education has been abandoned.177 
In the 1960s, some tribes began to contract with the federal government 
to manage BIA schools.178 Passage of the ISDEAA in 1975 accelerated the 
trend toward self-determination in education, as did the Tribally Controlled 
Schools Act of 1988 (TCSA).179 As Congress declared in the ISDEAA,  
a major national goal of the United States is to provide the 
quantity and quality of educational services and opportunities 
which will permit Indian children to compete and excel in the 
life areas of their choice, and to achieve the measure of self-
determination essential to their social and economic well-
being.180  
Most of these services are now provided by tribes through ISDEAA 
contracts and TCSA grants with the Bureau of Indian Education (BIE) 
                                                                                                                 
 175. Richard H. Pratt, The Advantages of Mingling Indians with Whites (1892), in 
AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS: WRITINGS BY THE “FRIENDS OF THE INDIAN” 1880-
1900, at 261 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 1973). Captain Pratt was the founder of the Carlisle 
Indian School in Pennsylvania. 
 176. COHEN, supra note 19, at 82. One court recently summarized “the legacy of the 
federal government's involvement in Indian education” as follows: 
The legacy is characterized by inadequate resource allocation, systematic 
exclusion of Indian parents and communities from any role in the education of 
their children, and a one-way transmission of white American education to the 
Indian child as a means to remove the child from his aboriginal culture and 
assimilate him into the white culture. 
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. Kempthorne, 496 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1066 (D.S.D. 2007). 
 177. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 2000 (2012) (declaring trust responsibility to fund BIA school 
system); id. § 2501(b) (affirming trust responsibility for education, but disavowing “further 
perpetuation of Federal bureaucratic domination of [education] programs”). 
 178. Daniel M. Rosenfelt, Indian Schools and Community Control, 25 STAN. L. REV. 
489, 507–12 (1973). 
 179. Hawkins-Stafford Elementary and Secondary School Improvement Amendments of 
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-297, 102 Stat. 130 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2501-2511 (2012)). 
 180. 25 U.S.C. § 450a(c) (2012). 
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within the DOI. As of September 2013, tribes and tribal organizations 
directly managed 126 of the 183 schools (69%) in the BIE system.181 Tribal 
colleges and universities are almost all managed by tribes.182 As 
contemplated by the ISDEAA, tribes have taken control of the educational 
process that will develop future leaders. 
Tribes have demonstrated their capacity to offer more dynamic academic 
programs than BIE has offered, with an emphasis on cultural education 
through tribally-controlled schools. Yet, many obstacles still hinder 
educational performance and have limited the positive impacts of the 
ISDEAA in the Indian education arena. Among the challenges faced by 
tribally-controlled education programs are (1) chronic underfunding of 
Indian education programs and administrative support costs; (2) inadequate 
investment to construct, reconstruct, and properly maintain tribal school 
facilities; and (3) repeated BIE reorganizations and realignments that have 
resulted in increasingly centralized BIE bureaucracy that has not fully 
embraced the ISDEAA objective of increasing tribal control over 
fundamental education policy decisions. Over the past few years, tribes 
have contested the federal imposition of new, more detailed programmatic 
requirements, performance assessments, and duplicative and burdensome 
reporting requirements. A new dialogue with the Joint Department of 
Interior and Department of Education Study Group on Indian Education 
seeks to modernize and advance the self-determination framework for 
Indian education to achieve high performing tribally-controlled schools. 
C. Title III, Self-Governance, and the 1988 Amendments 
The self-governance legislation in Title III had its roots in the 1975 
ISDEAA and agency failure to carry out Congress's intentions in that 
Act.183 As discussed above, Title I of the Act enabled participating tribes to 
enter into contracts with the BIA and the IHS to administer and deliver 
federal programs to Indian beneficiaries. By 1988, however, the 
implementation of Title I had revealed significant shortcomings that 
allowed federal agencies to exercise too much control while thwarting 
tribes' ability to adapt programs to local needs. In 1988, a handful of tribes, 
exasperated with the DOI's and the DHHS's failures to fully implement 
Congress's self-determination policy in Title I, persuaded Congress to 
address these problems in two ways: by significantly strengthening Title I 
                                                                                                                 
 181. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-774, INDIAN AFFAIRS: BETTER 
MANAGEMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY NEEDED TO IMPROVE INDIAN EDUCATION 3-4 (2013).  
 182. Id. at 3.  
 183. 25 U.S.C. §§ 450–450n, 455–458e, 458aa–458hh, 458aaa–458aaa-18 (2012). 
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and by introducing the Self-Governance Demonstration Project under Title 
III.184 
In crafting the 1988 Amendments, Congress expressed its outrage at the 
agencies’ implementation of the ISDEAA. While recognizing that “[t]he 
federal policy of Indian self-determination is one of the most progressive 
federal Indian policies in our Nation's history,”185 the Senate decried the 
“agencies' consistent failures over the past decade to administer self-
determination contracts in conformity with the law.”186 For example, the 
Senate cited the growth of a “contract monitoring bureaucracy,”187 “unduly 
burdensome reporting requirements,”188 the failure of the agencies to fully 
fund indirect costs,189 end-runs around the statutory declination process,190 
and other agency misbehavior. To address these issues, Congress made 
several key amendments to Title I, including the addition of a new section 
106 to clarify and protect contract funding levels191 and a new section 110 
allowing contractors to seek injunctive relief and damages in federal district 
courts.192 
The 1988 Amendments not only shored up Title I, however. They also 
introduced a new phase in the legal evolution toward tribal self-governance: 
the Tribal Self-Governance Demonstration Project under Title III.193 “Self-
governance” refers both to the broad principle that tribes have the right to 
govern themselves, and to particular statutory rights enabling them to do so 
through the use of federal program funding. As a statutory initiative, self-
governance (1) expands the types of programs and responsibilities that 
participating tribes can take over; (2) places greater emphasis on 
                                                                                                                 
 184. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act Amendments of 1988, 
Pub. L. No. 100-472, 102 Stat. 2289 (1988), repealed by Tribal Self-Governance 
Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-260, 114 Stat. 711 (2000) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 
458aaa–458aaa-18 (2012)). 
 185. S. REP. NO. 100-274, at 2 (1987), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2620, 2621. 
 186. Id. at 37, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2656. 
 187. Id. at 7, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2626. 
 188. Id.  
 189. Id. at 8-12, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2627-31. 
 190. Id. at 24, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2643. 
 191. Indian Self-Determination Amendments of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-472, § 205, 102 
Stat. 2285, 2292-94 (1988); S. REP. NO. 100-274, at 30-34, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
at 2649-53. 
 192. Indian Self-Determination Amendments of 1987, § 206, 102 Stat. at 2294-95; S. 
REP. NO. 100-274, at 34-36, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2653-55. 
 193. Indian Self-Determination Amendments of 1987, § 209, 102 Stat. at 2296-98 
(codified at 25 U.S.C. § 450f note (1988)), repealed by Tribal Self-Governance 
Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-260, § 10, 114 Stat. 711, 734. 
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minimizing oversight by federal agencies; and (3) maximizes flexibility for 
tribes to redesign programs and reallocate resources in their agreements. 
The origins of Title III illustrate the interplay of the self-governance 
philosophy and its legal mechanism in the ISDEAA. 
1. Bureaucratic Problems, the Alliance of American Indian Leaders, and 
the Constitution 
One reason self-governance did not occur until the 1988 Amendments is 
the bureaucratic stranglehold and monopoly that the federal agencies 
retained over tribal administration of self-determination contracts under 
Title I.194 Another reason is the lack of federal funding for tribal contractors' 
administrative costs, a problem commonly known as contract support cost 
shortfall.195 These bureaucratic problems, among others, spurred tribal 
leaders to pursue congressional action that eventually led to Title III.  
In 1986, Joe DeLaCruz, then President of the Quinault Nation, along 
with leaders of nine other tribes, formed the Alliance of American Indian 
Leaders (the Alliance).196 In 1987, the Alliance developed and submitted a 
proposal to the United States House Interior and Related Agencies 
Subcommittee on Appropriations. The proposal called on the United States 
Congress to adopt concurrent resolutions that acknowledged the role that 
Indian tribes played in the formulation of the United States Constitution, 
and that formally recognized the principle of government-to-government 
relations.197 Then, in the fall of 1987, the Arizona Republic published a 
series of stories that would serve as a catalyst to forever change the 
                                                                                                                 
 194. See S. REP. NO. 103-374, at 2 (1994) (describing 1988 amendments as response to 
“excessive bureaucracy and unnecessary contract requirements”); see also Johnson & 
Hamilton, supra note 78, at 1264–66 (describing the “byzantine bureaucratic burden on 
contracting tribes” under Title I).  
 195. See S. REP. NO. 100-274, at 8, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2627 (“Perhaps 
the single most serious problem with implementation of the Indian self-determination policy 
has been the failure of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Indian Health Service to provide 
funding for the indirect costs associated with self-determination contracts.”); see also. S. 
Bobo Dean & Joseph H. Webster, Contract Support Funding and the Federal Policy of 
Indian Tribal Self-Determination, 36 TULSA L. REV. 349 (2000). 
 196. The Alliance included the following tribal chairmen: Joe DeLaCruz, Quinault 
Nation; Wendell Chino, Mescalero Apache Tribe; Roger Jordain, Red Lake Band of 
Chippewa; Art Gambel, Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe; Larry Kinley, Lummi Nation; Willy 
Colgrover, Hoopa Valley Tribe; Ed Landerman, Rosebud Sioux; Richard Realbird, Crow 
Tribe; Ed Thomas, Tlingit and Haida Central Council; and Mickey Pablo, Confederated 
Salish & Kootenai. LUMMI SELF-GOVERNANCE MANUAL, supra note 1, at 2. 
 197. Id. 
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relationship between Indian tribes and the United States.198 The series dealt 
with the misuse of funds and corruption within the BIA, which prompted 
both chambers of Congress to call oversight hearings.199  
The Alliance met in Washington, D.C. during the same week that the 
hearing took place and some of the Alliance members attended the hearing. 
Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs Ross Swimmer proposed legislation 
which would have allowed the BIA to transfer to any Indian tribe, upon the 
tribe's request, its share of all BIA resources.200 As proposed by Assistant 
Secretary Swimmer, the legislation would have contained a provision 
absolving the United States of its trust responsibilities to any tribes that 
accepted the transfer.201 The Alliance balked at the proposal and urged 
Chairman Yates to reach a compromise through a demonstration project 
that maintained self-governance without abolishing the United States' trust 
responsibility.   
2. The Demonstration Project 
Chairman Yates liked the idea of a demonstration project, and in 1988 
Congress amended the ISDEAA to authorize the Indian Self-Governance 
Demonstration Project for five years.202 Nine of the ten tribes participating 
in the Alliance were the first tribes to initiate the self-governance planning 
process.203  
The demonstration project authorized a planning grant phase for twenty 
tribes, which would then go on to negotiate self-governance compacts with 
the Secretary of the Interior.204 The hallmark of these agreements was the 
unprecedented flexibility of tribal contractors to redesign programs and 
reallocate funding to suit local needs.205 In effect, these tribes would receive 
funds in the contractual equivalent of block grants from the Secretary.206  
                                                                                                                 
 198. Chuck Cook, Mike Masterson & Mark N. Trahant, Fraud in Indian Country, ARIZ. 
REPUBLIC, Oct. 4–11, 1987 (series of thirty articles). 
 199. Johnson & Hamilton, supra note 78, at 1267.  
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 1267-68. 
 202. Indian Self-Determination Amendments of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-472, § 209, 102 
Stat. 2289, 2296-98 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 450f note (1988)), repealed by Tribal Self-
Governance Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-260, § 10, 114 Stat. 711, 734. 
 203. LUMMI SELF-GOVERNANCE MANUAL, supra note 1, at 8. 
 204. 25 U.S.C. § 450f note (2012).  
 205. Id. § 303(a)(2).  
 206. See S. REP. NO. 100-274, at 39 (1987), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2620, 2658 
(referring to Title III agreements as “consolidated funding contracts”). 
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In 1991, Congress extended Title III for an additional three years to 
make up for BIA delays and amended Title III to include up to thirty tribes 
in the demonstration project.207 In addition, Congress authorized a study to 
include self-governance in the IHS.208 Congress included the IHS in the 
Self-Governance Demonstration Project when it passed the Indian Health 
Amendments of 1992.209 
Title III is no longer in effect because Congress enacted Title IV in 
1994,210 which created a permanent self-governance program for all bureaus 
within the DOI, and in 2000, Congress added Title V, 211 which completely 
repealed the demonstration project. In summary, after the 1994 
Amendments Title III applied only to self-governance agreements between 
participating tribes and the IHS, and the 2000 Amendments eliminated the 
demonstration project by creating a permanent self-governance program 
within the DHHS. 
Title III's broad reprogramming and reallocation authority were 
significant breakthroughs for tribal self-governance. The demonstration 
project was a success because it delicately balanced the interest of tribes to 
assume full responsibility over all available programs, functions, services, 
and activities (PFSAs) and funding under the Act, with less federal 
oversight after the PFSAs were assumed. However, because Title III was a 
demonstration project, its provisions were very general, providing the 
agencies with substantial discretion in implementing the statute. As 
discussed below, the permanent self-governance programs under Titles IV 
and V are more detailed and place more limits on the discretion of the 
Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Health and Human Services, 
respectively. Under Title III, the IHS retained the right to decide which 
tribes and how many tribes were eligible to participate in the demonstration 
project.212 Once the IHS determined that a tribe was eligible, the IHS held 
the right to decide whether it would sign an annual funding agreement with 
                                                                                                                 
 207. Tribal Self-Governance Demonstration Project Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-184, 
105 Stat. 1278 (1991) (repealed 2000). 
 208. Id. § 6(d), 105 Stat. at 1278-79. 
 209. Indian Health Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-573, 106 Stat. 4526 (repealed 
2000). 
 210. Indian Self-Determination Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-413, 108 Stat. 
4250 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 458aa–hh) (2012)); see discussion infra Part II.D. 
 211. Tribal Self-Governance Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-260, 114 Stat. 711 
(codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 458aaa–458aaa-18) (2012)); see discussion infra Part II.E. 
 212. 25 U.S.C. § 450f (2012). In contrast, every federally recognized tribe and tribal 
organization has the right to negotiate a self-determination contract under Title I. Id. § 
450f(a)(1).  
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the tribe and what provisions it would include.213 Even tribal 
reprogramming and reallocation authority were “subject to the terms of the 
written agreement,” giving the agencies significant control.214 
D. Title IV and the 1994 Amendments 
In 1994, Congress significantly amended the ISDEAA by enacting the 
Tribal Self-Governance Act, also known as the Indian Self-Determination 
and Education Act Amendments of 1994 (the 1994 Amendments).215 The 
Tribal Self Governance Act represented a “step in the direction of 
empowerment and away from paternalism . . . replac[ing] a stifling federal 
bureaucracy with tribal governments focused on choices and 
responsibility.”216 The 1994 Amendments revised a number of provisions in 
Title I and included a new Title IV, which implemented a permanent Tribal 
Self-Governance Program within the DOI.217 Title III, which was formerly 
the Self-Governance Demonstration Project for both the IHS and the DOI, 
became limited to only IHS programs. 
1. Legislative History 
By 1993, both the United States Congress and the tribes that participated 
in the Title III demonstration project were ready to move forward with 
legislation to make self-governance a permanent program.218 The 
demonstration project was deemed a success, as the Senate Committee 
noted: 
Since 1988, Interior has conducted Self-Governance under 
demonstration authority. The Self-Governance Demonstration 
Project has had measurable success. It has achieved the goals it 
set out to achieve—examining the benefits of allowing Tribes to 
assume more control and responsibility over [PFSAs]. It has also 
required [DOI] to enter into bilateral, negotiated agreements 
governing the transfer of responsibilities and associated funding 
                                                                                                                 
 213. Id. § 450f. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Indian Self-Determination Act Amendments of 1994, 108 Stat. 4250. The 1994 
Amendments established a permanent tribal self-governance program within the Department 
of the Interior (DOI), whereby the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), and every other bureau in 
the DOI that provides services to Indian tribes is authorized to transfer programs to 
participating tribes and tribal organizations. Id. 
 216. Johnson & Hamilton, supra note 78, at 1251.  
 217. 25 U.S.C. § 458aa. 
 218. Johnson & Hamilton, supra note 78, at 1269. 
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levels to Tribes and providing for streamlined management 
processes that remove layer upon layer of bureaucratic 
regulation and control. These agreements, known as Self-
Governance Compacts, are important binding agreements that 
reflect government-to-government negotiations. Self-
Governance encourages Tribal and Federal experimentation and 
flexibility.219 
However, the Senate Committee was also troubled “by the continuing 
refusal of the [DOI] for the past four years to negotiate, on a line-by-line 
basis with participating [tribes], tribal shares of [BIA] central offices funds 
and resources despite clear directives to do so.”220  
Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.) and Representative Bill Richardson (D-
N.M.) (then the Chairman of the United States House Subcommittee on 
Native American Affairs) introduced legislation in the Senate and House, 
respectively.221 Senator McCain's bill passed the Senate without a hearing 
and, in early 1994, the House Subcommittee considered Congressman 
Richardson's bill, House Bill 4842. At the eleventh hour of the 103rd 
Congress, Congressman Richardson got House Bill 4842 through the 
House, and the Senate passed the bill the following day. President Clinton 
signed the 1994 Amendments into law on October 25, 1994. It is notable 
that, over the years, legislative initiatives related to self-governance and the 
development of policies of Tribal Self-Governance have typically enjoyed 
broad bi-partisan support and relative stability.222  
2. Amendments to Title I 
In the 1994 Amendments, Congress also enacted a number of 
amendments to Title I, attempting once again to force the DHHS and DOI 
to implement self-determination as it was originally contemplated in 
1975.223 For example, Congress significantly strengthened the declination 
                                                                                                                 
 219. S. REP. NO. 103-205, at 5 (1993). 
 220. Id. at 9-10. 
 221. S. 1618, 103d Cong. (1993); H.R. 3508, 103d Cong. (1993). 
 222. Cornell & Kalt, supra note 6, at 16 (“[T]he survival of the U.S. federal policy of 
Indian self-determination through self-governance over the last four decades is rooted in a 
double appeal that it has for both the general electorate and their U.S. Congressional and 
Executive Branch representatives.”).  
 223. The Senate Committee was troubled by, among other things, the “excess 
bureaucracy and unnecessary contract requirements[]” undermining tribal self-determination 
and -governance and the agencies' failure to promulgate workable regulations. S. REP. NO. 
103-374, at 2-3 (1994).   
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criteria and procedures, restricting the Secretary's ability to deny tribal 
proposals.224 The 1994 Amendments also instituted the mandatory “model 
agreement” in section 108,225 ensuring uniform inclusion of key contracting 
rights of tribes.  
3. Title IV and the Permanent Self-Governance Program in DOI 
The Tribal Self-Governance Act of 1994, Title II of the 1994 
Amendments, reaffirmed that “the tribal right of self-government flows 
from the inherent sovereignty of Indian tribes and nations[.]”226 Congress 
recognized the United States' “special government-to-government 
relationship with Indian tribes, including the right of tribes to self-
governance.”227 Congress sought to enhance tribal self-governance by 
reducing federal bureaucratic control without abdicating the trust 
responsibility.228 
Title IV marked a break with Title I in several important respects. First, a 
tribe has to establish eligibility by demonstrating financial stability and 
financial management capability for the previous three fiscal years and 
completing a planning phase.229 The tribe must then initiate negotiations for 
a self-governance compact and annual funding agreement (AFA) with the 
Secretary of the Interior.230 A self-governance compact is an executed 
document that affirms the government-to-government relationship between 
a self-governance tribe and the United States.231 A compact differs from an 
AFA in various ways, including that parts of the compact apply to all 
bureaus within the DOI, rather than a single bureau, and that it is generally 
                                                                                                                 
 224. Indian Self-Determination Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-413, § 
102(6), 108 Stat. 4250, 4251-52 (amending section 102(a) of the ISDEAA) (codified at 25 
U.S.C. § 450f(a) (2012)). 
 225. Id. § 103, 108 Stat. at 4260-68 (establishing new section 108 of the ISDEAA, 25 
U.S.C. § 450l (2012)). 
 226. Id. § 202(1), 108 Stat. at 4271. 
 227. Id. § 202(2), 108 Stat. at 4271. 
 228. Id. §§ 202(3)–(4), 108 Stat. at 4271; id. § 203(4), 108 Stat. at 4271. 
 229. 25 U.S.C. § 458bb(c), (d) (2012). 
 230. Id. § 458cc. Grants are available for tribes to complete the planning and negotiation 
phases. See 25 C.F.R. pt. 1000, subpart C (2014) (regulating section 402(d) of ISDEAA 
regarding planning and negotiation grants); id. pt. 1000, subpart D (2000) (regulating 
financial assistance for planning and negotiating grants for non-BIA programs). 
 231. 25 C.F.R. § 1000.161. 
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negotiated to be perpetual in nature, not limited to any specific fiscal 
year(s).232   
Title IV does not contain a mandatory model agreement like that set 
forth in section 108 for Title I contracts. The parties must negotiate all of 
the terms of compacts and AFAs.233 As a result, provisions in compacts and 
AFAs can vary and be less predictable. Because there are no explicit 
declination appeal procedures in Title IV, tribes appear to have less 
leverage to negotiate terms.234 However, section 403(l) gives a tribal 
contractor the right to include in its Title IV compact or AFA any Title I 
provision it wishes—including the declination procedures of section 102(a), 
which limit the federal government’s discretion to deny proposals.235 
Funding provided under Title IV agreements must be equal to the amount 
the contractor would have been eligible to receive under Title I.236 
Perhaps most significantly, Title IV expanded tribal contractors' rights to 
redesign or consolidate PFSAs and to reallocate BIA funding. Title I allows 
redesign and reallocation, but only if the Secretary is notified and does not 
decline under section 102.237 Under Title IV, the Secretary does not have to 
approve redesign unless it involves a waiver of a regulation.238 Nor does the 
Secretary have to approve the reallocation of funds among programs that a 
tribe administers under a single AFA.239 The 1994 Amendments also 
require the Secretary to interpret laws and regulations “in a manner that will 
facilitate the inclusion” of programs into agreements,240 similar to the 
favorable Indian canons of construction.241 
                                                                                                                 
 232. Id. § 1000.161.  Appendix A of the Title IV regulations provides a model format for 
self-governance compacts. See also 25 U.S.C. § 458cc(b)(1) (2012). 
 233. See 25 U.S.C. 458cc(b). 
 234. But see Aleutian Pribilof Islands Ass’n v. Kempthorne, 537 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9-10 
(D.D.C. 2008) (holding that BIA refusal to apply Title I declination criteria to Title IV 
proposal was “arbitrary and capricious”).   
 235. 25 C.F.R. § 1000.84 (2000); see 25 U.S.C. § 458cc(l)(2012).  
 236. 25 C.F.R. § 1000.91(a)(1) (2014); see 25 U.S.C. § 458cc(g)(3)(2012).  The Act 
makes six sections of Title I mandatorily applicable to Title IV agreements. 25 U.S.C. § 
458ff(c)(2012).  
 237. 25 U.S.C. § 450j(j) (2012). 
 238. 25 C.F.R. § 1000.88 (2014). 
 239. Id. §§ 1000.103, 1000.145. An exception to this general rule is that reallocation, 
consolidation, or redesign of non-BIA programs of “special geographic, historical, or 
cultural significance” are subject to secretarial approval. Id. § 1000.144 (2000). 
 240. 25 U.S.C. § 458cc(i). 
 241. Cf. id. § 450l(c) (section 1(a)(2) of model agreement) (“Each provision of the 
[ISDEAA] and each provision of this Contract shall be liberally construed for the benefit of 
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4. Extension of Self-Governance Beyond BIA to Other DOI Programs 
The 1994 Amendments offered not only greater program flexibility and 
less federal oversight, but also an expanded scope of contractibility. The 
Secretary of the Interior is required to annually publish in the Federal 
Register a list of the non-BIA programs that are available for tribal 
operation, and set programmatic targets for the number of signed 
agreements each year in order “to encourage bureaus of the Department to 
assure that a significant portion of such [PFSAs] are actually included” in 
self-governance agreements.242 This provision is an important victory for 
participating self-governance tribes because of the prospect of assuming 
control of programs on the vast public lands that overlap or adjoin Indian 
lands. Title IV authorizes non-BIA agencies to enter into agreements with 
requesting tribes to transfer control of these lands, which were historically 
under tribal control.243  
Considering the vast amounts of formerly tribal lands administered by 
non-BIA agencies within Interior, however, progress in developing Title IV 
agreements with those agencies so far has been exceedingly slow. As of 
2007, one researcher counted a total of only eighteen such agreements: one 
with the Bureau of Land Management, seven with the Bureau of 
Reclamation, two with the Fish and Wildlife Service, five with the National 
Park Service, and three with the Office of the Special Trustee for American 
Indians.244 The problem has been that the Department has interpreted non-
BIA contracting provisions narrowly to leave most tribal proposals to the 
discretion of the respective bureau.245  
As interpreted by the DOI—and so far, by the courts as well—there are 
two distinct vehicles for tribes to assume non-BIA programs: mandatory 
inclusion under section 403(b)(2) and discretionary inclusion under section 
403(c).246  Section 403(b)(2) states that funding agreements may include 
PFSAs administered by the DOI, “other than through the Bureau of Indian 
                                                                                                                 
the Contractor . . . .”); Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985) 
(stating that statutes for the benefit of Indians to be liberally interpreted in favor of tribes).  
 242. 25 U.S.C. § 458ee(c)(2). 
 243. See id. § 458cc(c) (authorizing inclusion in funding agreements of Interior programs 
that “are of special geographic, historical, or cultural significance to the participating Indian 
tribe”). 
 244. Mary Ann King, Co-Management or Contracting? Agreements Between Native 
American Tribes and the U.S. National Park Service Pursuant to the 1994 Tribal Self-
Governance Act, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 475, 530 tbl. 2 (2007). 
 245. Id. at 477-78. 
 246. 25 U.S.C. § 458cc(b)(2); id. § 458cc(c). 
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Affairs, that are otherwise available to Indian tribes or Indians[.]”247 
Programs are “otherwise available,” in the Department's interpretation, if 
they would be eligible to contract under Title I.248 This means that they 
must be programs “for the benefit of Indians because of their status as 
Indians” under section 102.249 Such programs must be included in Title IV 
agreements upon tribal request.  
Non-BIA programs that are not specifically targeted to Indians may still 
be included in Title IV agreements under the discretionary authority in 
section 403(c), which allows inclusion of PFSAs “administered by the 
Secretary of the Interior which are of special geographic, historical, or 
cultural significance to the participating Indian tribe requesting a 
compact.”250 These programs, while benefiting a wider constituency than 
Indians alone, may still be awarded on a non-competitive basis in a Title IV 
agreement at the bureau's discretion.251 
The Ninth Circuit upheld the DOI's two-tiered implementation of non-
BIA compacting authority in Hoopa Valley Indian Tribe v. Ryan.252 The 
Hoopa Valley Tribe sought to contract as a matter of right, first under Title 
I and then under Title IV, various PFSAs carried out by the Bureau of 
Reclamation (BOR) under the Trinity River Basin Fish and Wildlife 
Management Act,253 as amended.254 The BOR ultimately determined that 
two of the proposed PFSAs fell within the mandatory contracting authority, 
but the other twenty-six did not, because they benefited all stakeholders in 
the Trinity River and its fisheries, not the Tribe alone.255 The district court 
upheld BOR's decision and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Trinity River 
restoration program was not “specifically targeted” to Indians, but served 
                                                                                                                 
 247. Id. § 458cc(b)(2). 
 248. See 25 C.F.R. § 1000.123–.124 (2014); see also 65 Fed. Reg. 78,688, 78,695 (Dec. 
15, 2000) (explaining DOI interpretation as well as tribal position that programs “otherwise 
available” include all PFSAs aside from inherent federal functions). 
 249. 25 U.S.C. § 450f(a)(1)((E) (2012) (directing Secretary to approve, upon request, 
proposal to assume “programs . . . for the benefit of Indians because of their status as Indians 
without regard to the agency or office of the . . . Department of the Interior within which it is 
performed”). 
 250. Id. § 458cc(c); see 25 C.F.R. § 1000.126 (2014) (defining “special geographic, 
historical or cultural” significance). 
 251. 25 C.F.R. § 1000.128. 
 252. Hoopa Valley Indian Tribe v. Ryan, 415 F.3d 986, 993 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 253. Act of Oct. 24, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-541, 98 Stat. 2721. 
 254. Hoopa Tribe, 415 F.3d at 989. 
 255. Id. 
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local, state, and commercial interests.256 Therefore, the BOR restoration 
projects (aside from the two identified by the BOR) were not “for the 
benefit of Indians because of their status as Indians,” and thus were not 
eligible for mandatory contracting under either Title I or Title IV.257 While 
the Tribe was free to negotiate with the BOR to assume these other nineteen 
activities under the discretionary 403(c) provision for programs of “special 
geographic, historical, or cultural significance” to the Tribe, the BOR was 
not required to assent.258 
This narrow interpretation of Title IV non-BIA contracting authority, 
which effectively gives the non-BIA bureaus unchecked discretion to deny 
tribal proposals, is a significant problem to which we will return in Part 
IV.C infra. Non-BIA bureaus within the Department tend to see their 
constituency as national, not tribal, leading them to view Title IV “not as a 
step in a long path toward Indian self-determination, but as an aberration in 
public land policy and an intrusion into public land management.”259 These 
non-BIA bureaus within the DOI will—as the Hoopa Tribe case 
illustrates—defend their program and funding oversight with costly 
litigation based upon their broad discretion, thus creating a chilling effect 
for tribes that would even consider attempting to negotiate a Title IV 
agreement with that agency.260 In order to carry out its stated goal of 
expanding tribal self-governance throughout Interior, Congress should 
strengthen Title IV's contracting authority for non-BIA programs. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 256. Id. at 991. 
 257. Id. at 992 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 450f(a)(1)(E) (2012)). 
 258. Id. at 991 (relying heavily on its earlier decision in Navajo Nation v. Dep't of Health 
& Human Servs., 325 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc)). In the earlier decision, the 
Navajo Nation proposed a mandatory contract to administer the Temporary Assistance to 
Needy Families (TANF) program, but the court held that TANF “is not a federal program 
designed specifically to benefit Indians” under section 102(a)(1)(E), but rather one “that 
collaterally benefit[s] Indians as a part of the broader population.” Navajo Nation, 325 F.3d 
at 1138. 
 259. King, supra note 244, at 481 (referring to the National Park Service, but in our 
experience the description could apply just as well to the other land management agencies 
within DOI.). 
 260. See Hearing on S. 1715 and S. 1696 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 108th 
Cong. 113-15 (2004) (testimony of Ben Stevens, Council of Athabascan Tribal Governments 
(CATG) describing difficulties negotiating CATG’s agreement with U.S. Fish & Wildlife 
Service under current Title IV and advocating for amendments to facilitate agreements 
between tribes and non-BIA agencies in DOI). 
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E. Title V and the 2000 Amendments 
The Tribal Self-Governance Amendments of 2000261 made the self-
governance demonstration project in Title III of the Act a permanent 
program within the DHHS. The 2000 Amendments repealed Title III and 
enacted two new titles, V and VI.262 Title V established a permanent self-
governance program within the DHHS and Title VI authorized a study of 
future inclusion of non-IHS agencies in the DHHS Self-Governance 
Program. 
1. Legislative History 
Tribal efforts to seek the enactment of permanent self-governance 
legislation on the DHHS side began in 1996 at the fall Self-Governance 
Conference in Phoenix, Arizona. Tribal leaders and technical 
representatives, in consultation with tribes, worked on drafting a bill that 
tribes around the country could support. In June 1997, after the tribal draft 
was completed, Representatives George Miller (D-Cal.) and Don Young 
(R-Alaska) co-sponsored the bill's introduction as House Bill 1833 in the 
United States House.263 On October 5, 1998, House Bill 1833 passed the 
House. Following a hearing in the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs 
(SCIA), however, the bill was not scheduled for Senate floor action prior to 
the adjournment of Congress.  
In the next session, Representatives Miller and Young introduced House 
Bill 1167 on March 17, 1999, which included all of the provisions that had 
been worked out the year before. House Bill 1167 passed the House on 
November 17, 1999. A Senate version of the bill, Senate Bill 979, was 
introduced by Senators Ben Nighthorse Campbell (R-Colo.) and McCain on 
May 6, 1999.  
The SCIA held a hearing on the bill on July 28, 1999, during which 
Administration and tribal witnesses testified in strong support of the bill.264 
On April 4, 2000, the Senate agreed to substitute language in Senate Bill 
979 as proposed by the SCIA, incorporated that text into House Bill 1167 in 
lieu of the House-passed language, and then passed the amended House Bill 
1167. From early April until early July, tribal representatives, SCIA staff, 
the House Resources Committee, the DHHS, and other administration 
                                                                                                                 
 261. Tribal Self-Governance Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-260, 114 Stat. 711 
(codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 458aaa through 458aaa-18). 
 262. Id. §§ 4-5, 10, 114 Stat. at 713-32, 734. 
 263. No similar bill was introduced in the Senate. 
 264. Hearing on S. 979 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 106th Cong. (1999). 
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representatives worked hard to resolve all differences between the two bills. 
By the middle of July, all of the differences between the two bills were 
worked out and the compromise bill was enacted by the House and Senate.  
On July 24, 2000, the House passed House Bill 562, which amended 
House Bill 1167 to incorporate all the changes that were agreed to by the 
SCIA and Resources Committee staff after Senate action in April. The 
measure was then sent to the Senate, which, under unanimous consent, 
approved and cleared the bill for the White House on July 27, 2000. On 
August 18, 2000, the act was signed into law.265 
2. Title V Innovations 
Title V retains Title III's broad goal of strengthening tribal sovereignty 
and the principle of Indian self-determination, while also promoting the 
federal government's official policy of government-to-government 
relationships with tribes.266 The provisions of Title V are much more 
comprehensive than those in Title III, however, and were drafted to address 
up front many of the problems that tribal leaders ran into as they sought full 
implementation of Title IV.267  
Title V operates in a manner similar to Title IV. Section 503 of the Act 
permits each existing Title III tribe to participate in the permanent self-
governance program under Title V instead.268 In addition to tribes and tribal 
consortia transitioning from Title III to Title V, an additional fifty eligible 
tribes per year are entitled to participate in Title V.269 Like Title IV, eligible 
tribes are those that have completed a planning phase, requested entry into 
the program, and demonstrated financial stability and financial management 
capability for three years.270 However, Title V allows that evidence of the 
absence of uncorrected significant and material audit exceptions in the 
required annual audit is conclusive evidence of financial stability and 
capability.271 
                                                                                                                 
 265. Tribal Self-Governance Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-260, 114 Stat. 711 
(codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 458aaa-458aaa 18). 
 266. Id. § 3, 114 Stat. at 712 (declaration of policy) (included in 25 U.S.C. § 458aaa 
notes). 
 267. See, e.g., Hearing on S. 979 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, supra note 264, 
at 80 (statement of Henry Cagey, Lummi Indian Nation, describing Title IV as “skeletal 
legislation” that proposed Title V would fill out). 
 268. 25 U.S.C. § 458aaa-2(a). 
 269. Id. § 458aaa-2(b)(1).  
 270. Id. § 458aaa-2(c). 
 271. Id. §458aaa-2(c)(2).  
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Title V requires the Secretary of the DHHS to negotiate and enter into 
funding agreements that authorize participating tribes to “plan, conduct, 
consolidate, administer, and receive full tribal share funding,” including 
IHS competitive grants for all PFSAs “that are carried out for the benefit of 
Indians because of their status as Indians without regard to the agency or 
office of the Indian Health Service within which the [PFSA] is 
performed.”272 Title I also authorizes contracting for programs that are “for 
the benefit of Indians,” but the scope of that term has given rise to 
disagreements between the agency and the tribes.273 Under section 505(b), 
the term refers to all IHS programs where “Indian tribes or Indians are 
primary or significant beneficiaries.”274 
Like Title IV (and unlike Title I) Title V contains no mandatory model 
agreement. Nevertheless, both compacts and funding agreements are 
required, and certain provisions must be included in the agreements. The 
compact should include general terms of the government-to-government 
relationship and terms that control from year to year.275 The funding 
agreements must set forth terms generally identifying the PFSAs to be 
performed, budget categories, funds to be provided (including those 
provided on a recurring basis), time and transfer method of funds, 
responsibilities of the Secretary, and other provisions as agreed.276 Either 
the compact or funding agreement must include provisions relating to 
health status reports, reassumption of PFSAs, final offers for compacts and 
funding agreements and rejection thereof, negotiation in good faith, 
expenditure of secretarial savings, prohibition on the Secretary’s 
diminishment of the trust responsibility, and which agency officials are 
responsible for “final agency action.”277   
Title V significantly strengthens tribal rights in comparison with Title IV 
in that it includes declination appeal procedures similar to Title I, limiting 
the Secretary’s discretion not to enter into an agreement.278 Title V is 
similar to Title IV in terms of negotiating annual funding agreements, but 
Title V provides tribes with a right of “final offer” in compact and funding 
agreement negotiations where the Secretary and participating tribe cannot 
                                                                                                                 
 272. Id. §§ 458aaa-3(a), 458aaa-4(b)(1). 
 273. See, e.g., Navajo Nation v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 325 F.3d 1133 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
 274. 25 U.S.C. § 458aaa-4(b)(2). 
 275. Id. § 458aaa-3(a), (b). 
 276. Id. § 458aaa-4(d). 
 277. See id. § 458aaa-6(a). 
 278. See id. §§ 458aaa-6(b)-(d).  
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agree on terms, including funding levels.279 Tribes must submit the final 
offer to the Secretary, who has no more than forty-five days (or longer if 
agreed to by the tribe) to make a determination on the offer.280 If the 
Secretary does not properly or timely reject a final offer, it is deemed 
approved as a matter of law.281 The Secretary's rejection of a final offer 
must be contained in a written notification based on a finding that clearly 
demonstrates, or is supported by controlling legal authority, that (1) the 
funding level request exceeds what is due, (2) the requested PFSA is an 
inherent federal function, (3) the tribe cannot carry out the requested PFSA 
without creating a risk to public health, or (4) the tribe is ineligible to 
participate in self-governance.282  
The burden of proof on appeal of rejections of final offers is more 
stringent than that in the Title I (and Title IV) declination process: The 
Secretary has “the burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing 
evidence the validity of the grounds for rejecting the offer.”283 Title V also 
provides that the tribe could instead proceed directly to federal district court 
pursuant to section 110 of Title I.284 When the Secretary rejects a final 
offer, the Secretary must agree to all severable portions that do not justify a 
rejection and provide the tribe with an option to enter into a partial compact 
or funding agreement, subject to any additional changes necessary to 
conform the compact or funding agreement to the severed portions.285 A 
tribe that enters into such a partial agreement retains the right to appeal the 
Secretary's rejection.286  
Reallocation and redesign authority under Title V is similar to that under 
Title IV. Section 506(e) authorizes tribes to redesign or consolidate PFSAs 
and reallocate or redirect funds for such PFSAs “in any manner which the 
Indian tribe deems to be in the best interest of the health and welfare of the 
Indian community being served,” so long as such action does not result in 
denying eligibility for services to groups that would otherwise be eligible 
                                                                                                                 
 279. See id. § 458aaa-6(b).   
 280. Id.  
 281. Id.  
 282. Id. § 458aaa-6(c)(1)(A); see id. § 458aaa(a)(4) (defining “Inherent federal 
functions” as “those Federal functions which cannot legally be delegated to Indian tribes”).  
 283. Id. § 458aaa-6(d).  
 284. Id. § 458aaa-6(c)(1)(C).  
 285. Id. § 458aaa-6(c)(1)(D).  
 286. Id. § 458aaa-6(c)(2). 
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for service under federal law.287 The provision includes no secretarial right 
to review.  
The Title V legislation also made several very important amendments to 
Title I of the ISDEAA. Section 6 of the 2000 amendments amended section 
102(e)(1) of Title I to make clear that in any civil action under section 110 
of the Act (federal district court actions), the Secretary has the burden of 
proof to establish the validity of his grounds for declining a proposal.288  
Section 7 amended section 105(k) of Title I to provide that tribes and 
tribal organizations are “deemed an executive agency and part of the Indian 
Health Service” for federal property acquisition purposes.289 This change 
allows tribes and tribal organizations to use the Veterans Administration 
Prime Vendor as a source of supplies. Section 105(k) was also amended to 
require the Secretary to enter into acquisition agreements with tribes for 
goods available to the General Service Administration (GSA) or other 
federal agencies but previously unavailable to tribes, including acquisition 
from prime vendors.290 
Section 8 of the bill added a new section 105(o) to Title I,291 allowing 
tribes to designate patient records as federal records in order to make those 
records eligible for storage in Federal Records Centers. Finally, section 9 of 
the bill reinstated section 106(c) of Title I,292 a provision requiring the 
Secretaries of the DHHS and DOI to prepare and submit to Congress an 
annual report on the implementation of the ISDEAA. 
3. Title VI 
The 2000 ISDEAA amendments also added Title VI, which directed the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services to study the feasibility of 
extending the tribal self-governance program to non-IHS agencies within 
the DHHS.293 The Secretary was to consult with tribes and other 
stakeholders and consider a number of factors, including effects on program 
beneficiaries, statutory or regulatory impediments, likely costs or savings, 
quality assurance and accountability measures, and others. In short, the 
study was to determine whether Congress should authorize tribes to 
                                                                                                                 
 287. Id. § 458aaa-5(e). 
 288. Id. § 450f(e)(1). 
 289. Id. § 450j(k).  
 290. Id.  
 291. Id. § 450j(o).  
 292. Id. §450j-1(c).  
 293. Tribal Self-Governance Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-260, § 5, 114 Stat. 
711, 731–732 (2000). 
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compact non-IHS PFSAs, just as Title IV allows tribes to compact certain 
non-BIA PFSAs within the DOI.294  
Over the next few years, tribal representatives worked with the DHHS to 
ensure that core self-governance principles—such as redesign and 
reallocation authority—informed the feasibility study. In its final report to 
Congress in 2003, the DHHS concluded that it was feasible to extend tribal 
self-governance within the Department.295 The report listed eleven 
programs from three non-IHS agencies that could be included initially296: 
 
Administration on Aging 
• Grants for Native Americans 
 
Administration for Children and Families 
• Tribal Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) 
• Low Income Home Energy Assistance 
• Community Services Block Grant 
• Child Care and Development Fund 
• Native Employment Works 
• Head Start 
• Child Welfare Services 
• Promoting Safe and Stable Families 
• Family Violence Prevention: Grants for Battered Women's Shelters 
 
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) 
• Targeted Capacity Expansion 
 
Beneficiaries of these programs would likely benefit from their inclusion 
in the demonstration project, the report concluded. Stakeholders, such as 
state and local governments, did not oppose the demonstration project.297 A 
number of statutes would need to be amended and regulations changed or 
waived to give tribes the authority to assume—and redesign or 
consolidate—the PFSAs and ensure program accountability.298 Based on its 
                                                                                                                 
 294. See 25 U.S.C. § 458cc(b)(2). 
 295. Office of the Ass't Sec’y for Planning & Evaluation, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., Tribal Self-Governance Demonstration Feasibility Study at 8 (Mar. 2003). 
 296. Id. at 17. 
 297. Id. at 8-9. 
 298. Id. at 18 & app. E. 
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cost-benefit analysis, the DHHS recommended moving forward with 
legislation implementing the demonstration project.299 
While tribes did not agree with every finding of the feasibility study,300 
they strongly supported the idea of the demonstration project. Shortly after 
the feasibility study was released, tribal representatives crafted draft 
legislation that became the Tribal Self-Governance Demonstration Project 
for the DHHS.301 Introduced by Senators Campbell and Daniel Inouye (D-
Haw.) on October 1, 2003, Senate Bill 1696, the Department of Health and 
Human Services Self-Governance Act of 2004, basically tracked the 
recommendations of the DHHS feasibility study, while addressing some of 
the tribal objections to the study.302  
On May 19, 2004, the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs (SCIA) held a 
hearing on Senate Bill 1696.303 Several tribal leaders and representatives 
                                                                                                                 
 299. Id. at 12-21. 
 300. For example, tribes objected to the following provisions: 
• Indirect Cost “Caps”: Eight of the eleven PFSAs proposed for inclusion in the 
demonstration project imposed statutory or regulatory limits on administrative costs, 
making it difficult if not impossible for tribes to fully recover their indirect costs 
associated with those PFSAs. The study recommended that the administrative cost 
caps be maintained, in order to keep down the costs of the demonstration project. 
• Reallocation Ceiling of 20%: To maintain a baseline level of services for each PFSA, 
the report recommended a “maintenance of effort” provision that would cap the 
reprogramming of funding at 20% of the funds for a particular PFSA.  
• Burden of Proof on Appeal: On appeals of final offers, and on decisions to withdraw 
regulatory waivers, the report recommended that the burden of proof fall on the tribe, 
and the Secretary's decision be reversed only if it is “arbitrary and capricious.” In Title 
V, by contrast, the burden is on the Secretary to show by clear and convincing 
evidence that the decision is correct. 
 301. S. 1996, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 302. See S. REP. 108-412, at 4 (2004) (stating that Committee on Indian Affairs agreed 
with tribal recommendations following Feasibility Study, and that Committee “largely 
adopted those recommendations in S. 1696”). For example, Senate Bill 1996 dropped the 
proposed 20% cap on reallocation; instead, the bill allowed unlimited reallocation of funds 
so long as their use met allowable cost standards established in Title V. S. 1696, § 2 (setting 
forth reallocation authority in section 606(a)). For waivers and appeals, the bill placed a 
heavy burden of proof on the Secretary to demonstrate by “clear and convincing evidence” 
the validity of the agency decision. Id. (setting forth burden of proof in section 
606(b)(4)(B)). 
 303. Hearing on S. 1715 and S. 1696 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 108th Cong. 
(2004). 
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testified in strong support of the bill.304 Despite an invitation from the 
Committee, however, no representative from the DHHS appeared at the 
hearing.305 This absence was perplexing since the bill largely reflected the 
agency's own recommendations from just one year before. While some 
provisions departed from the DHHS recommendations, the provisions were 
not unlike similar ones already existing in Title V.  
On June 16, 2004, the SCIA favorably reported Senate Bill 1696 to the 
full Senate and recommended passage. In its committee report on 
November 16, 2004, the SCIA chronicled the success of the self-
determination policy and described the extension of this success to other 
programs beyond the BIA and IHS as “the next evolution in tribal self-
governance.”306 With its goals of minimizing federal bureaucracy and 
maximizing tribal authority in decision-making, Senate Bill 1696 
“continues the steady march of meaningful tribal control of programs 
affecting their communities.”307   
Despite the favorable Senate report and strong support from tribes, 
Senate Bill 1696 died at the end of the session. The Bush administration's 
lack of support carried forward through a second term, with the DHHS 
flatly refusing to participate in any discussion of the bill. Under its new 
Chairman, Senator McCain, the SCIA shifted its legislative priorities, and 
tribal leadership did the same. As discussed below in Part III.E., it is time 
for serious and meaningful efforts to revive legislation implementing the 
Title VI demonstration project. 
IV. The Future of Self-Governance  
The success of self-governance under the ISDEAA is reflected in the 
remarkable growth of its programs over the years. In 1991, only seven 
tribes entered self-governance agreements with the BIA, for a total amount 
of slightly over $27 million.308 By Fiscal Year (FY) 2013, 254 tribes and 
tribal consortia entered into 106 funding agreements, operating $432 
million in programs, functions, services and activities.309 Approximately 
                                                                                                                 
 304. S. REP. NO. 108-412, at 7 (2004). 
 305. Id. 
 306. Id. at 2. 
 307. Id. at 4. 
 308. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUDGET JUSTIFICATIONS AND PERFORMANCE 
INFORMATION, FY 2014, INDIAN AFFAIRS, at IA-TG-4 (n.d.), available at http://www.bia. 
gov/cs/groups/xocfo/documents/text/idc1-021730.pdf. 
 309. S. REP. NO. 108-412, at 4.  
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40% of all federally recognized Tribes are self-governance tribes under the 
DOI program. 
On the IHS side, in 1994 only fourteen tribes participated in self-
governance agreements totaling $51 million.310 In FY 2015, according to 
the IHS, eighty-nine compacts and 114 funding agreements will transfer 
about $1.6 billion—over one-third of the IHS total appropriation—to tribes 
and tribal organizations.311 Many of these compacts represent multiple 
tribes—including the Alaska Tribal Health Compact, which includes 
virtually all of the 228 tribes in Alaska—so well over half of the 566 
federally recognized tribes participate in self-governance either directly or 
through tribal organizations and consortia.312 
Despite the resounding success of the self-governance program in 
improving services and building tribal capacity, the growth documented 
above has slowed to a crawl in the last few years. Part of this is the normal 
flattening of the growth curve as the programs mature, but there are several 
specific obstacles that could, and should, be removed to encourage further 
participation in tribal self-governance. Among these are Congress's failure 
to appropriate sufficient funds for contract support costs; continuing agency 
resistance to the letter and spirit of the self-governance statutes; legislative 
gaps and other problems in Title IV; and the restriction of self-governance 
within the DHHS to IHS programs. In addition, opportunities exist to 
expand self-governance beyond the DOI and DHHS to other federal 
agencies, such as the Departments of Transportation, Agriculture, Justice, 
and others.  
A. Contract Support Costs 
Carrying out federal programs requires that tribes develop and maintain 
administrative capacity. As Congress recognizes, that takes money. The 
ISDEAA commands that “[t]here shall be added to [program funding] 
contract support costs which shall consist of an amount for the reasonable 
costs for activities which must be carried on by a tribal organization as a 
                                                                                                                 
 310. Office of Tribal Self-Governance, Indian Health Serv., FY 2007 Self-Governance 
Data Table (n.d.) (on file with authors). 
 311. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FISCAL YEAR 2015 INDIAN HEALTH SERVICE 
JUSTIFICATION OF ESTIMATES FOR APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES 138 (n.d.), available at http:// 
www.ihs.gov/budgetformulation/includes/themes/newihstheme/documents/FY2015Congressio
nalJustification.pdf. 
 312. Id. at 210 (listing Self-Governance Funded Compacts); see also Alaska Area, 
INDIAN HEALTH SERV., http://www.ihs.gov/alaska/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2015) (describing 
Alaska Native health care system). 
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contractor to ensure compliance with the terms of the contract and prudent 
management . . . .”313 If these administrative or overhead costs are not fully 
paid, tribes must often re-direct program funds to cover these necessary 
expenses, thus lowering the level of services provided (or at least funds 
spent) below what the Secretary would have otherwise provided.314 This 
creates a strong disincentive for tribes to contract or compact programs.315 
In 1987, responding to “the overwhelming administrative problems 
caused by indirect cost shortfalls,”316 Congress amended the ISDEAA by 
adding a new section 106, which requires payment of full contract support 
cost (CSC) funding.317 Unfortunately, over the ensuing fifteen years neither 
the IHS nor the BIA paid the full amount tribal contractors needed, as the 
agencies themselves acknowledged in CSC “shortfall reports” mandated by 
the ISDEAA.318 In FY 2010, for example, the BIA paid on average only 
75.17% of tribes' ongoing CSC needs,319 while IHS paid on average 
81.5%.320 For larger contractors, this resulted in budget gaps in the millions 
of dollars,321 while smaller contractors' shortfalls were equally devastating 
proportionately.  
Full funding is critical because of the devastating effects of CSC 
shortfalls. By definition, CSCs are “the reasonable costs for activities 
which must be carried on by a tribal organization as a contractor to ensure 
compliance with the terms of the contract and prudent management.”322 
These are fixed and unavoidable costs, such as insurance, property and 
personnel management systems, audits, and facilities overhead and 
                                                                                                                 
 313. 25 U.S.C. § 450j-1(a)(2) (2012). 
 314. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO RCED 99-150, INDIAN SELF-DETERMINATION 
ACT: SHORTFALLS IN INDIAN CONTRACT SUPPORT COSTS NEED TO BE ADDRESSED 5 (1999). 
 315. The fact that tribes continue to do so even in the face of persistent and deep contract 
support cost shortfalls testifies to the broader social benefits of self-determination and self-
governance beyond the specific programs themselves, including tribal capacity-building and 
community empowerment.  
 316. S. REP. NO. 100-274, at 12 (1987), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2620, 2631. 
 317. 25 U.S.C. § 450j-1. 
 318. See id. § 450j-1(c). 
 319. BIA, Fiscal Year 2010 Contract Support Cost Shortfall Report (n.d.).  
 320. IHS, Fiscal Year 2011 Contract Support Cost Shortfall Report (n.d.) (on file with 
authors) (2010 data). The agencies have different ways of designating the reports, with IHS 
identifying both the year of submission and the (prior) year to which the data pertain. 
 321. Id. For example, the FY 2012 IHS report indicates that the Alaska Native Tribal 
Health Consortium suffered a “Total FY 2011 CSC Deficiency” of $8,568,748 and the 
Southcentral Foundation a CSC shortfall of $3,479,733.  
 322. 25 U.S.C. § 450j-1(a)(2) (emphasis added).  
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maintenance. Faced with CSC shortfalls, tribes have limited options, none 
of them good. 
First, tribes can cut indirect costs. Cost reduction, however, can only go 
so far before becoming counterproductive. At a certain point, administrative 
infrastructure (personnel, computer systems, accounting systems) 
deteriorates, reducing productivity and efficiency and jeopardizing contract 
compliance.323  
Tribes can also use program funding. Using direct program dollars to 
cover CSC shortfalls reduces the resources available for already 
underfunded and much-needed programs and services, in effect imposing a 
financial penalty on tribes for exercising their right to self-determination.324  
Alternatively, tribes can use tribal resources. Some tribes cover CSC 
shortfalls with revenues from tribal businesses, trust funds, or other 
resources. These resources could otherwise be used for economic 
development, land acquisition, additional services, or other purposes.325 
Forcing tribes to divert their own funds to administer federal programs not 
only creates tangible harm, in the form of lost economic opportunities, but 
it is unfair and inconsistent with how other government contractors are 
treated. As a government contracting expert testified to the Senate 
Committee on Indian Affairs in 2004, it would be “unthinkable” for the 
General Services Administration to suggest that IBM bear the indirect costs 
of building computers for the government.326   
Faced with these unappealing options, it is not surprising that some tribes 
have opted to forgo self-determination and self-governance under the 
ISDEAA altogether. The lack of full contract support funding has 
                                                                                                                 
 323. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 314, at 39-40.  
 324. The Principal Chief of the Cherokee Nation explained this dilemma to the Senate 
Committee on Indian Affairs:  
The contract support cost problem has caused severe financial strains on the 
Cherokee Nation's programs and facilities, as it has for many other tribes in the 
country. What it means in real terms is that the Nation must reduce these 
critical health, education and other programs to pay for these shortages. 
Tribal Contract Support Cost Technical Amendments: Hearing on S. 2172 Before the S. 
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 109th Cong. 34 (2004) [hereinafter Hearing on S. 2172] (written 
statement of Chad Smith).  
 325. S. REP. NO. 100-274, at 8-9 (1987), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2620, 2627-28 
(“Tribal funds derived from trust resources, which are needed for community and economic 
development, must instead be diverted to pay for the indirect costs associated with programs 
that are a federal responsibility.”). 
 326. Hearing on S. 2172, supra note 324, at 20 (statement of Herbert Fenster (citing U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7). 
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undoubtedly played a significant role in the leveling off of participation in 
self-determination and self-governance in recent years. In 2006, the DOI's 
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs noted the relatively 
flat rate of participation in self-governance, and told Congress that “tribes 
have indicated that they would increase their overall participation if the 
issue of contract support cost funding was resolved.” 327 
CSC funding has spawned long and intensive litigation against both the 
BIA and IHS, including two United States Supreme Court decisions. In 
2005, the Supreme Court ruled, in Cherokee Nation v. Leavitt,328 that IHS 
was liable for failing to pay full CSC in years before Congress began 
“capping” CSC spending—that is, identifying a specific amount IHS was 
“not to exceed.”329 In the absence of a statutory restriction, the Court held, 
IHS's entire lump-sum appropriation was legally available to reallocate to 
fully pay CSC needs.330 The Court noted that the Act uses the word 
“contract” 426 times, and concluded that contracts with tribes are as 
binding as with any other government contractor.331  
Cherokee left unresolved the question of government liability during 
years when there were statutory restrictions—the so-called “cap years.” For 
several years, the lower courts and appeals boards held unanimously that 
the caps protected the government from liability. The ISDEAA makes all 
funding, including for CSC, “subject to the availability of 
appropriations.”332 The caps limited the amount of CSC available, the 
reasoning went, so the agency could not be faulted if it spent no more. This 
reasoning prevailed in the Federal Circuit's 2010 decision in the Arctic 
                                                                                                                 
 327. Obstacles and Impediments to Expansion of Self-Governance: Oversight Hearing on 
Tribal Self-Governance Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 109th Cong. 129 (2006) 
(statement of George T. Skibine); see also Contract Support Costs Within the Indian Health 
Service Annual Budget: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Resources, 106th Cong. 14 (1999) 
(statement of Kevin Gover, Ass’t Secrectary for Indian Affairs, that “[t]he first step” toward 
expanding self-governance “is definitely 100 percent funding of contract support”); NIHB 
REPORT, supra note 11, at 9 (showing that 27% of IHS direct service tribes, and 28% of Title 
I contracting tribes, viewed lack of contract support funding as a barrier to contracting and 
compacting). 
 328. 543 U.S. 631 (2005). 
 329. Id. at 634-35.  Congress began capping CSC appropriations for BIA in FY 1994, 
and for IHS in FY 1998. E.g., Dep't of the Interior & Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 
Pub. L. No. 105-83, 111 Stat. 1543, 1582-83 (1997) (providing that, in FY 1998, “not to 
exceed $168,702,000 shall be for payments to tribes and tribal organizations for contract 
support costs associated with ongoing contracts or grants or compacts” with IHS). 
 330. Leavitt, 543 U.S. at 647. 
 331. Id. at 639, 644.  
 332. 25 U.S.C. § 450j-1(b) (2012). 
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Slope case, after which the prospects of cap-year CSC claims appeared 
bleak.333 Less than a year later, however, the Tenth Circuit in Ramah 
Navajo Chapter v. Salazar held that the caps limit the aggregate amount the 
BIA may distribute, but do not excuse underpayment of any single 
contractor's full CSC as long as the appropriation is enough to cover that 
individual contract.334 That decision created a split among the federal 
appeals courts, and the Supreme Court granted the government's petition to 
review the Ramah decision and resolve the conflict. 
The Ramah case was—and remains, as of this writing—a long-running 
CSC class action on behalf of tribes and tribal organizations that contract or 
compact with the BIA or the Office of Self-Governance within the DOI. 
The portion of the case before the Supreme Court in 2012 involved CSC 
shortfall claims for cap years 1994 through 2001. In a 5-4 decision, the 
Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit.335 The majority opinion—authored by 
Justice Sotomayor and joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and 
Kagan—began by summarizing the Cherokee decision and stressing that 
ISDEAA contracts are as binding as any other contracts.336 Under 
government contracting law, the rule has long been that if an appropriation 
is sufficient to pay a contractor in full, the fact that the government expends 
the appropriation on other permissible purposes (including other contracts) 
does not excuse the government from paying the contractor in full.337 This 
rule, which derives from an 1892 Court of Claims case, Ferris v. United 
States, protects both the contractor and the United States by ensuring 
government contracting is not overly risky and hence expensive.338 
Applying this rule, the majority noted that the annual CSC appropriation of 
between $91 million and $125 million far exceeded the amount due to any 
single contractor, including Ramah.339 Because the BIA had discretion over 
how to distribute this amount, the agency could have paid Ramah its full 
CSC need, even though that would have meant paying another contractor 
                                                                                                                 
 333. Arctic Slope Native Ass'n v. Sebelius, 629 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2010), vacated, 133 
S. Ct. 22 (2012).  
 334. Ramah Navajo Chapter v. Salazar, 644 F.3d 1054 (10th Cir. 2011), aff’d, Salazar v. 
Ramah Navajo Chapter, 132 S. Ct. 2181 (2012).  
 335. Salazar, 132 S. Ct. at 2195. 
 336. Id. at 2188. 
 337. Id. at 2189. 
 338. Id. at 2189-90. 
 339. Id. at 2190. 
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less.340 Thus, the Court concluded, the BIA could not avoid the contractual 
promise to pay Ramah's CSC in full.341  
The Ramah decision applied directly only to the BIA, but after that 
decision, the Court vacated a contrary Federal Circuit decision involving 
IHS and the Arctic Slope Native Association.342 On remand, the Federal 
Circuit followed Ramah, noting that the IHS's appropriations cap language 
was nearly identical to the BIA’s, and holding that the IHS too was 
obligated to pay the tribal contractor's full CSC.343 With liability for past-
year shortfalls established, tribal contractors anticipated expeditious 
settlements of both the Ramah class action against the BIA and the many 
individual claims against the IHS, but those expectations were mistaken.344 
No settlement has been reached in the Ramah case nearly two years after 
the Supreme Court’s decision, and settlements of IHS claims have been few 
and far between.345 The Supreme Court did not offer any guidance as to 
what “full” CSC means, and the parties took divergent views that proved 
difficult to reconcile. In early 2014, however, settlements began to 
accelerate, some for substantial amounts such as $25 million, $25.5 million, 
and $52 million.346  
                                                                                                                 
 340. Id. 
 341. Id. at 2191. In dissent, Chief Justice Roberts (joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, 
and Alito) argued that two “unambiguous restrictions” limited available funding and thus 
precluded liability. First, the appropriations caps limited the total amount BIA could pay in 
each year. Second, the ISDEAA “reduction clause” says that BIA “is not required to reduce 
funding for programs, projects, or activities serving a tribe to make funds available to 
another tribe or tribal organization.” 25 U.S.C. § 450j-1(b) (2012). The cap prevented BIA 
from reprogramming funds from outside the CSC appropriation to cover the shortfalls, while 
the reduction clause prevented BIA from shifting funds within the appropriation from one 
tribe to cover the shortfall of another. Unlike in Cherokee Nation, there were no unrestricted 
funds, and unlike in Ferris, funds available to one contractor were not legally available to 
another. Therefore, Chief Justice Roberts and the other dissenters would have held that tribes 
are not entitled to full CSC. 
 342. Arctic Slope Native Ass'n, Ltd. v. Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. 22 (2012), vacating 629 F.3d 
1296 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 343. Arctic Slope Native Ass'n, Ltd. v. Sebelius, 501 Fed. Appx. 957, 959 (Fed. Cir. 
2012). 
 344. See Kimberly Kindy, Federal Contractors on Edge as Indian Tribes Wait for Claims, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/federal-contractors-on-
edge-as-indian-tribes-wait-for-claims/2013/12/22/5662fe28-5c3e-11e3-95c2-13623eb2b0e1_ 
story.html. 
 345. Id. (noting that less than 1% of claims had been settled as of December 2013). 
 346. See Judgment Fund Payment Search, U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, https://jfund.fms.treas. 
gov/jfradSearchWeb/JFPymtSearchAction.do (last visited Nov. 24, 2014). 
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While a resounding victory for tribes, the Ramah decision nonetheless 
did not ensure full CSC funding moving forward. The Court concluded its 
opinion by noting that Congress had given the BIA (and IHS) conflicting 
statutory mandates.347 The ISDEAA requires the BIA to pay full CSC to all 
contractors, yet in every year at issue Congress failed to appropriate enough 
for the BIA to do so.348 The Court offered several suggestions to Congress 
should it wish to resolve this dilemma, including amending the ISDEAA to 
allow payment of less than full CSC, placing a moratorium on new 
contracts, making line-item CSC appropriations for every ISDEAA 
contract, or appropriating enough CSC funding.349 Early in the FY 2014 
budget process, the Obama Administration adopted one of the Court’s 
“solutions” and proposed to incorporate by reference into the 
Appropriations Act funding tables developed by the BIA and IHS that 
would identify a specific amount of CSC available for each contract.350 This 
would have created, in effect, line-item appropriations placing every 
contractor on notice of the amount of CSC available, arguably defeating the 
Ferris rule and avoiding government liability for CSC shortfalls. This 
proposal to circumvent the Ramah ruling provoked an immediate firestorm 
of outrage not only from Indian country, but from other government 
contractors.351 The United States Chamber of Commerce and the National 
Defense Industrial Association had filed a Supreme Court amicus brief in 
the Ramah case arguing that a ruling for the Government would have 
“enormous destabilizing effects on the government contracting 
                                                                                                                 
 347. Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 132 S. Ct. 2181, 2195 (2012). 
 348. Id. 
 349. Id. 
 350. See Letter from Dr. Yvette Roubideaux, Director, HIS, to Tribal Leaders (June 12, 
2013) (describing Administration’s reasoning in adopting proposal based on Supreme 
Court’s options in Ramah opinion) (on file with authors). 
 351. See, e.g., Nat’l Congress of Am. Indians, Resolution #REN-13-015: Request That the 
Administration Resolve Contract Support Costs Claims, Withdraw Its Proposal to Limit 
Contract Support Costs in Its FY 2014 Budget, and Support Full Contract Support Cost 
Funding (2013), available at http://www.ncai.org/attachments/Resolution_vMSQbplUjZzuadF 
LeexAJarvOvfJQXBdnGcYMEqgSUbRpxojiFv_REN-13-015%20final.pdf; Letter from U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce to Secretary Kathleen Sebelius, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. 
(Oct. 9, 2013) (on file with authors). 
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community.”352 The proposal was also met with strong opposition from 
many in Congress.353 
In the end, Congress did not adopt the “mini-cap” proposal; instead, the 
Appropriations Act contained no caps at all, either on individual contracts 
or aggregate CSC spending.354 This restored the statutory landscape to that 
the Supreme Court delineated in Cherokee Nation: with no statutory 
restriction on CSC spending, the agencies’ entire lump-sum appropriations 
were available to pay CSC in full.355 Having no legal basis to do otherwise, 
IHS and the BIA announced their intentions to pay full CSC in FY 2014 
and again in FY 2015.356 As stated in the BIA’s FY 2015 budget 
justification to Congress: “Full funding for CSC ensures tribes have 
sufficient resources to oversee program implementation and allows tribes to 
deliver services more effectively. Full funding for tribal administration of 
programs is a key element of the Administration’s commitment to support 
tribal self-governance.”357 
For the moment, then, the struggle has shifted from whether to pay full 
CSC to how much constitutes full payment and how to resolve CSC issues 
moving forward. Following a directive from Congress in the Explanatory 
Statement accompanying the FY 2014 Appropriations Act,358 the BIA and 
IHS initiated a joint consultation with tribes “to formulate long-term 
accounting, budget, and legislative strategies that will yield solutions going 
forward.”359 As of this writing, these strategies are still being formulated 
                                                                                                                 
 352. Brief for Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et al. as Amici 
Curae Supporting of Respondents at 6, Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 132 S. Ct. 2181 
(2012) (No. 11-551).  
 353. See, e.g., Letter from Sen. Mark Begich et al. to Sylvia Mathews Burwell (Sept. 30, 
2013) (on file with authors). In this letter, a bipartisan group of eleven senators wrote to 
OMB Director Sylvia Mathews Burwell calling the mini-caps proposal “short-sighted and 
ill-timed” and urging the Administration to withdraw it. Id. 
 354. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, 128 Stat. 5.  
 355. See Cherokee Nation v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631, 641-42 (2005). 
 356. Kimberly Kindy, U.S. Agrees to Fully Fund 2014 Service Contracts with Indian 
Tribes, Lawmakers Say, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
politics/us-agrees-to-fully-fund-2014-service-contracts-with-indian-tribes-lawmakers-say/2014/ 
02/13/5f2f3cd6-94bc-11e3-b46a-5a3d0d2130da_story/html. 
 357. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUDGET JUSTIFICATIONS AND PERFORMANCE 
INFORMATION, FISCAL YEAR 2015: INDIAN AFFAIRS at IA-ES-1 (n.d.), available at http:// 
www.doi.gov/budget/upload/FY2015_IA_Greenbook.pdf. 
 358. See 160 CONG. REC. H475, H975 (Jan. 15, 2014). 
 359. Letter to Tribal Leaders from Dr. Yvette Roubideaux, Director, IHA, and Kevin 
Washburn, Assistant Secretary of the Interior, Indian Affairs (Feb. 12, 2014) (on file with 
authors). 
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and the mechanics of full funding are still being developed and refined. 
Tribes are assured of full CSC funding only through FY 2015. Given the 
agencies’ historical and continuing resistance to tribal self-governance (as 
discussed next), it would not be surprising to see the re-emergence of the 
line-item mini-caps or some other proposal to circumvent or subvert the 
right to full CSC. 
B. Implementation Issues: Continuing Agency Resistance to Self-
Governance 
CSC funding has hardly been the only issue creating tension between 
tribes and federal agencies. If there is anything that tribes—and Congress—
have learned over the years, it is that the DOI and DHHS can be counted on 
to resist tribal self-governance, because it requires the transfer of program 
authority and associated funding from the federal bureaucracy to tribal 
control.360 While the agencies have made some progress in acknowledging 
tribes' statutory rights to self-governance, often they continue to interpret 
and implement the statutes as narrowly as possible, in contravention of the 
ISDEAA's mandate that the statute and the contracts be interpreted liberally 
for the benefit of tribes and in favor of transferring programs and funding to 
tribes.361  
Recently both IHS and the BIA have taken legal positions directly 
contrary not only to tribal interests, but also to clear statutory language. For 
example, in Susanville Indian Rancheria v. Leavitt,362 IHS rejected the 
Tribe's final offer under Title V because the Tribe proposed to charge 
                                                                                                                 
 360. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 100-274, at 37 (1987), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2620, 
2656 (“The strong remedies provided in [the 1988] amendments are required because of 
[BIA's and IHS's] consistent failures over the past decade to administer self-determination 
contracts in conformity with the law”); H.R. REP. NO. 106-477, at 34-35 (1999), reprinted in 
2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. 573, 592 (“Because the Act requires the agencies to divest themselves of 
programs, staff, and funding at tribal request, the courts should not give Administrative 
Procedure Act-type deference to agency decisionmaking.”). 
 361. See 25 U.S.C. § 450l(c) (2012) (section 1(a)(2) of model agreement) (“Each 
provision of the [ISDEAA] and each provision of this Contract shall be liberally construed 
for the benefit of the Contractor to transfer the funding and following related 
[PFSAs] . . . .”); id. § 458aaa-11(f) (“Each provision of this part  and each provision of a 
compact or funding agreement shall be liberally construed for the benefit of the Indian tribe 
participating in self-governance and any ambiguity shall be resolved in favor of the Indian 
tribe.”); id. § 458aaa-11(a) (requiring Secretary to interpret all federal laws, executive 
orders, and regulations in a manner that will facilitate inclusion of PFSAs into Title V 
agreements, implementation of compacts and funding agreements, and achievement of tribal 
health goals and objectives). 
 362. No. 2:07-cv-259-GEB-DAD, 2008 WL 58951 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2008). 
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pharmacy service beneficiaries a small co-pay. IHS provided no funding for 
pharmacy services, and the Tribe determined that without the user fees, the 
Tribe would be unable to provide such services at all. IHS took the position 
that the Tribe could not charge beneficiaries because the agency itself 
cannot do so, despite the plain language of the controlling Title V 
provision: “The Indian Health Service under this sub-chapter shall neither 
bill nor charge those Indians who may have the economic means to pay for 
services, nor require any Indian tribe to do so.”363 The court held that this 
provision clearly did not prevent the Tribe from charging; it prevented IHS 
from requiring the Tribe to charge.364 Remarkably, IHS argued that if the 
court found the statute ambiguous, it must defer to IHS's interpretation 
under the common-law Chevron doctrine,365 despite the statutory rule of 
construction that ambiguities be resolved in favor of tribes.366 The court 
found no ambiguity, however.367 
The DOI, too, has abused the declination process and even attempted to 
circumvent it altogether. In Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. Kempthorne,368 
the BIA declined the Tribe's contract proposal to run a school, but the 
cursory declination letter merely cited three declination criteria without 
including specific findings demonstrating that the criteria were met.369 The 
letter did not include a detailed explanation of the decision, nor did it 
include the documents the agency relied on in making that decision.370 The 
court ruled the declination deficient, holding that the Secretary's burden of 
proof requires that he clearly demonstrate, through a detailed explanation 
with specific findings, that a declination decision is justified.371 Because the 
BIA failed to comply with the declination statute and regulations, the court 
did not find it necessary to address the merits of the BIA's decision, and 
held the contract deemed approved by operation of law.372 
                                                                                                                 
 363. 25 U.S.C. § 458aaa-14(c) (emphasis added). 
 364. Susanville, 2008 WL 58951 at *7. 
 365. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 
(1984) (holding that when a statute is ambiguous, courts must generally defer to the 
reasonable interpretations of the federal agency charged with administering the statute). 
 366. 25 U.S.C. § 458aaa-11(f) (2012). 
 367. Susanville, 2008 WL 58951 at *7. 
 368. 496 F. Supp. 2d 1059 (D.S.D. 2007). 
 369. Id. at 1064-65. 
 370. Id. at 1065. 
 371. Id. at 1067-68. 
 372. Id. 
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The IHS suffered a similar fate when it failed to comply with the “final 
offer” procedures under Title V.373  The Maniilaq Association, an Alaska 
Tribal Organization, proposed to incorporate into its funding agreement a 
lease of a health clinic in the Native Village of Ambler.374 The IHS did not 
respond within the statutorily required fourty-five days, and when it did, it 
argued that the proposal was not a proper final offer because leases cannot 
be included in funding agreements.375  The court rejected IHS’s narrow 
interpretation of the ISDEAA and held that the final offer was valid and 
deemed approved as a matter of law.376 
The BIA went a step further in Aleutian Pribilof Islands Ass'n v. 
Kempthorne377 by attempting to deny the tribal contractor's appeal rights 
altogether. For many years, the Aleutian Pribilof Islands Association 
(APIA), a nonprofit consortium of Alaska tribes, had performed certain 
cultural heritage resource preservation activities under its Title IV 
agreement. In 2005, the BIA decided that the proper beneficiary of the 
cultural heritage program was the regional for-profit corporation, The Aleut 
Corporation (TAC), not the thirteen federally recognized tribes represented 
by the APIA.378 BIA simply removed the funds from the APIA's agreement 
with no written explanation of its decision and without notifying APIA of 
its right to appeal or how to do so.379 The BIA argued that the declination 
procedures and criteria were not triggered, because the APIA was not the 
“primary beneficiary” of the program.380 The court rejected this argument, 
holding that the BIA's attempted end-run around the declination criteria was 
“arbitrary and capricious.”381  
                                                                                                                 
 373. See 25 U.S.C. § 458aaa-6(b) & (c). 
 374. Maniilaq Ass’n v. Burwell, Civ. Action No. 13-cv-380 (TFH), 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 117084 (D.D.C. Aug. 22, 2014).  The clinic is one of the facilities operated by 
Maniilaq under the Village Built Clinic program, which IHS has chronically underfunded for 
years.  Maniilaq proposed a lease under the authority of the ISDEAA, 25 U.S.C. § 450j(l), a 
Title I provision incorporated into the Alaska Tribal Health Compact as well as Title V.  See 
id. § 458aaa-15(a). 
 375. Burwell, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117084, at *7-*8. 
 376. Id. at *33.  The court discussed the canon of construction favoring tribes—which is 
incorporated into Title V at 25 U.S.C. § 458aaa-11(f)—is support of its conclusion that 
“Congress intended the ISDEAA to be implemented in a manner favoring flexibility in 
funding agreements like the one at issue in this case.”  Id. at *12. 
 377. 537 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 378. Id. at 5. 
 379. Id. 
 380. Id. at 10. 
 381. Id. at 12; cf. S. REP. NO. 100-274, at 24 (1987), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2620, 2643 (condemning agency “threshold” arguments for avoiding declination criteria, and 
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While the APIA case turned on Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 
claims—making it unnecessary for the court to reach APIA’s ISDEAA 
claims—typically the standard of review in declination cases is not the 
same as the deferential APA standard, which requires the plaintiff to show 
that the agency's decision is “arbitrary, capricious . . . or . . . not in 
accordance with law.”382 This deferential standard of review imposes a 
heavy burden of proof on the party challenging agency action.383 In 
contrast, the ISDEAA imposes a heavy burden of proof on the agency to 
justify its declination decisions, providing that the Secretary “shall have the 
burden of proof to establish by clearly demonstrating the validity of the 
grounds for declining the contract proposal (or portion thereof).”384  
The ISDEAA does not require the agencies to fund proposals to run 
programs they had not previously run themselves.385  But in Pyramid Lake 
Paiute Tribe v. Burwell,386 the IHS declined the Tribe’s proposal to assume 
operation of an Emergency Medical Services program that the agency had 
been funding for almost twenty years.  The IHS determined it did not want 
to fund the program going forward, so the applicable funding level was $0, 
and the Tribe asked for more than that, allowing IHS to decline.387 The 
court held, however, that the applicable funding level is determined at the 
time of the proposal, and IHS could not subsequently cancel the program 
and avoid the requirements of the ISDEAA.388 
The examples above—which could be multiplied389—illustrate the 
agencies' continuing efforts to frustrate tribal rights to self-determination 
and self-governance seemingly inscribed clearly in the ISDEAA. To 
advance the cause of tribal self-governance, the statutes need to be 
                                                                                                                 
stating intent that denials of tribal proposals be “handled only through the declination 
process”). 
 382. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).  
 383. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
 384. 25 U.S.C. § 450f(e) (2012).  
 385. Los Coyotes Band of Cahuilla & Cupeno Indians v. Jewell, 729 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 
2013). 
 386. No. 1:13-cv-01771 (CRC), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142386 (D.D.C. Oct. 7, 2014). 
 387. Id. at *17; 25 U.S.C. § 450f(a)(2)(D). 
 388. Id. at *18. 
 389. See, e.g., Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation v. United 
States, 637 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. July 27, 2009) (rejecting IHS attempt to make decision 
declining contract support cost funding unreviewable through Rule 19 argument); see also 
infra notes 408-11 and accompanying text (discussing recent DOI and DHHS efforts to 
remove “477 program” funding from self-governance agreements so agencies could assert 
more direct control). 
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strengthened and improved, beginning with Title IV, the DOI Self-
Governance law. 
C. Title IV Amendments 
After Title IV was enacted in 1994, there followed a long and 
contentious negotiated rulemaking process, during which numerous gaps 
and shortcomings in Title IV became apparent. In 2000, the same year the 
Title IV regulations were finalized, Congress enacted Title V, the DHHS 
version of Self-Governance.390 
It soon became apparent that Title V worked much better than Title IV. 
Having learned from the problems experienced by tribes—and by the 
federal government—in implementing Title IV agreements, Congress in 
Title V filled many of the gaps and corrected many of the problems in Title 
IV. Tribal leaders determined that Title IV should be amended to address 
these issues and to conform to Title V. 
Tribal and federal leaders thus began a process to amend Title IV, which 
remains incomplete as of this writing. Tribal representatives engaged in 
ongoing discussions of draft Title IV legislation with representatives from 
the BIA and other DOI personnel. In 2003, a bill was introduced and 
favorably reported by the SCIA, but never made it out of the Committee.391 
In 2006, the SCIA again considered comprehensive Title IV 
amendments,392 but again the initiative died at the end of the session.  
The tribal-federal workgroup continued its negotiations, and in October, 
2007, House Bill 3994 was introduced. The DOI continued to resist certain 
key provisions, however—for example, one allowing tribes to assume, as of 
right, non-BIA PFSAs. In a last-ditch effort to secure passage of the bill in 
2008, tribes agreed to delete this provision and made other concessions. 
Nonetheless, this bill also ran out of steam as the congressional term and 
the Bush administration wound down.  
After the Obama administration took office, self-governance Tribes 
reinitiated dialogue with House and Senate staff on legislation to amend 
Title IV. A major effort was again made to amend Title IV with the 
“Department of the Interior Tribal Self-Governance Act of 2010,” which 
                                                                                                                 
 390. See 65 Fed. Reg. 78688 (Dec. 15, 2000) (final Title IV regulations, codified at 25 
C.F.R. pt. 1000). 
 391. See S. REP. NO. 108-413 (2004); Dep’t of the Interior Tribal Self-Governance Act of 
2003, S. 1715, 108th Cong. (2004).  
 392. See Obstacles and Impediments to Expansion of Self-Governance: Oversight 
Hearing on Tribal Self-Governance Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 109th Cong. 
(2006). 
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was introduced in the House as House Bill 4347 and passed the House on 
September 22, 2010.393 House Bill 4347 was received in the Senate, and 
referred to the SCIA, but was met with Departmental opposition in a 
hearing on November 18, 2010, and failed to move further toward 
enactment.394 House Bill 4347 would have made several amendments to 
Title I, including providing a clearer definition of “self-determination 
contract”; adding a requirement for liberal construction of contractual 
ambiguities resolved in favor of the tribal contractor; and inserting a 
provision for additional allowability of costs for tribal governing bodies.395   
House Bill 4347 included substantial amendments to Title IV as well. It 
sought to reduce the Secretary’s discretion to deny tribal assumption of 
PFSAs in non-BIA DOI agencies; bring the “final offer” timeline and 
burden of proof standard in declinations in line with those provided in Title 
V; clarify how the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) provides coverage 
under the ISDEAA; add a wide range of construction/facilities provisions, 
including additional tribal capacity to further assume federal responsibilities 
under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the National 
Historic Preservation Act (NHPA); and clarify the Secretary’s capacity to 
repeal any regulation inconsistent with the provisions of the bill.396 A 
similar bill to House Bill 4347 was introduced the following session as 
House Bill 2444, “Department of the Interior Tribal Self-Governance Act 
of 2011,” but it failed to leave the Subcommittee on Indian and Alaska 
Native Affairs. Follow-up legislation was introduced in 2012 by Senator 
Daniel Akaka (D-Haw.) with Senate Bill 3685, but it similarly did not leave 
the SCIA.397  
On May 9, 2013, SCIA Chairwoman Senator Cantwell (D-Wash.) and 
Chairman Barrasso (R-Wy.) reintroduced the legislation as Senate Bill 919, 
                                                                                                                 
 393. H.R. REP. NO. 111-603 (2010). But see Hobbs, Straus, Dean & Walker, General 
Memorandum 10-118 (Oct. 1, 2010) [hereinafter General Memorandum 10-118], available at 
http://www.npaihb.org/images/resources_docs/weeklymailout/2010/october/week1/GM_10-11 
8_SelfGovBillApproved_by_House.pdf (describing how the published House Report differs 
from the passed legislation due to late amendments). 
 394. H.R. 4347, To Amend the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act 
to Provide Further Self-Governance by Indian Tribes, and for Other Purposes: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 111th Cong. (2010). 
 395. See General Memorandum 10-118, supra note 393, at 1. 
 396. Id. at 2. 
 397. Department of the Interior Tribal Self-Governance Act of 2012, S. 3685, 112th 
Cong. 
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the “Department of the Interior Tribal Self-Governance Act of 2013.”398 
Hearings on Senate Bill 919 were held on January 29, 2014, and the bill 
was reported out of the Committee in August 2014.  The Congressional 
Budget Office released its report on the bill on November 13, 2014, and 
determined that passage of the bill would no net effect on spending. Despite 
this encouraging development, passage during the current Congress appears 
unlikely, but tribes will continue to push for passage in spite of the 
increasingly partisan political environment. 399  
After over two decades, tribes persist in pursuing Title IV amendments. 
The remaining long-term issues of contention mainly involve non-BIA 
Programs. Tribes would like to expand the scope of mandatory compacting 
to programs of which Indians are significant beneficiaries, as opposed to 
exclusive beneficiaries under the current DOI interpretation.400 The current 
statutory language within Title IV gives DOI bureaus too much discretion 
and negotiating leverage. Finally, non-BIA agencies within the DOI have 
consistently opposed efforts that would enhance tribal ability to assume 
more non-BIA programs on a mandatory basis. 
As the cases described above illustrate, tribes need these types of strong 
statutory protections given the DOI's historical and continuing resistance to 
self-governance. Amending Title IV to bring it into line with Title V would 
greatly simplify self-governance for tribes by creating a relatively uniform 
legal regime for both agencies.  
D. Title VI and the Expansion of Self-Governance within DHHS 
Another key legislative initiative is to implement the demonstration 
project for non-IHS agencies within the DHHS. Although the DHHS has 
already found this expansion of self-governance viable in its feasibility 
study of 2003, the agency can be expected to continue its opposition to 
actual legislation.401  
The central issue is that the Title VI demonstration project would 
devolve control of PFSAs from DHHS agencies to tribes. To the extent that 
non-IHS agencies deal with tribes at all, it is through a grantor-grantee 
relationship that allows the agencies to impose strict controls on the use of 
                                                                                                                 
 398. The House companion bill, House Bill 4546, was introduced by Rep. Peter DeFazio 
(D-Or.) on May 1, 2014. 
 399. See, e.g., Congress Set to Pass Historically Few Laws in 2013, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 11, 
2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/dec/11/news/la-pn-congress-few-laws-2013-2013 1211. 
 400. See supra Part III.D.  See also 25 C.F.R. §§ 1000.123–124 (2000). 
 401. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 450j(o), 450j-1(C) (2012) (recounting DHHS resistance to Title VI 
bill in 2003-2004). 
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agency resources. Such a relationship differs markedly from the 
government-to-government relationship under self-governance, where tribal 
contractors can redesign programs and reallocate funds to suit tribal needs 
rather than agency priorities. Shifting from a grantor-grantee to a self-
governance relationship would also require federal officials to emerge from 
their offices and actively negotiate compacts and funding agreements with 
participating tribes and tribal organizations.  
The contrast between a grantor-grantee mentality and a government-to-
government relationship poses an intangible but very real obstacle to the 
further expansion of tribal self-governance within the federal government. 
In 2011, the DHHS created a Self-Governance Tribal Federal Workgroup 
(SGTFW) to further explore the findings of the 2003 feasibility study 
(concluding that self-governance expansion was possible within the 
DHHS).402 When the SGTFW issued its Final Report in September 2013, it 
focused in on many of the grant programs within the DHHS, and found that 
“[t]he overarching barrier to expansion of Self-Governance is the lack of 
legislative authority to conduct a Self-Governance demonstration project in 
HHS programs outside of IHS.”403 The Workgroup found that Title VI 
authorized the 2003 feasibility study, but that the ISDEAA itself limits the 
DHHS grant programs that can be incorporated into funding agreements 
under Title V.404 Nonetheless, the DHHS took the position that the 
Workgroup was not authorized to work on legislation to overcome the 
perceived legal and logistical barriers to the expansion of self-
governance.405 Following the Final Report, tribal members of the SGTFW 
requested that the Department expand the charge of the SGTFW, or 
establish a new working group, to develop draft legislation to implement a 
Title VI demonstration project. The Secretary of the DHHS, however, 
denied this request, stating “[t]he Department does not have plans to create 
a Workgroup for purposes of working on draft [self-governance] legislation 
with tribal representatives.”406 Although the Final Report concludes that 
                                                                                                                 
 402. See DHHS Self-Governance Tribal Fed. Workgroup, Final Report 4 (Sept. 26, 
2013).  
 403. Id. at 8. 
 404. Id. (referencing 25 U.S.C. § 458aaa-4(b)(1)-(2) (limiting incorporation of grant 
programs into ISDEAA compacts and funding agreements to grant programs that are 
“carried out for the benefit of Indians because of their status as Indians”)). 
 405. See id. at 11-12. 
 406. Letter from Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of DHHS, to Chairwoman Malerba, 
Mohegan Tribe (July 26, 2013) (addressed also to tribal co-signers of June 4, 2013 letter 
requesting SGTFW continuation on legislation). 
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“[e]xpansion of Self-Governance in HHS remains a priority,”407 it will 
likely fall to tribes to develop and advocate legislation to implement the 
expansion of self-governance to non-IHS agencies within the DHHS, as 
envisioned in Title VI. 
Another example of this dynamic—the federal bureaucracy's inherent 
resistance to yielding its control and funding to tribes—can be seen in the 
DHHS's and the BIA's recent change in position on so-called “477 Plans.” 
The 477 Program, named after Public Law 102-477,408 allows tribes to 
consolidate previously fragmented employment and training-related grant 
funds from the Departments of Labor, DOI, and DHHS into a single 477 
Plan with a unified budget and reporting system. For many years, 477 funds 
have been transferred to self-governance tribes through ISDEAA Title IV 
agreements. But in October, 2008, in the waning days of the Bush 
administration, the DHHS announced that funding for 477 Plans would no 
longer be transferred through ISDEAA agreements. Reportedly, the Interior 
Solicitor's Office determined that there was no legal authority to provide 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Family (TANF) funds and possibly other 
funds in 477 Plans through ISDEAA agreements, although DOI did not 
release any formal legal analysis to that effect. Instead of ISDEAA 
agreements, the agencies proposed that the 477 funds would be transferred 
through a grant process administered under DOI regulations.409 Then, in 
2009, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), at the request of the 
DHHS, issued Circular A-133, a compliance supplement which required 
477 tribes to report 477 expenditures separately by funding source rather 
than by expenditure under a tribal 477 Plan. These changes would give the 
DOI and the DHHS significantly more control over how tribes administer, 
account for, and report on 477 funds. The agencies have so far delayed 
implementation of these unilateral changes, and different legislative efforts 
have been made to correct the problems tribes have encountered from this 
change.410 The most recent legislative effort to “fix 477” is Senate Bill 
                                                                                                                 
 407. DHHS Self-Governance Tribal Fed. Workgroup, supra note 402, at 14. 
 408. Indian Employment, Training, and Related Services Demonstration Act of 1992, 
Pub. L. No. 102-477, 106 Stat. 2302 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3417 
(2012)). 
 409. See 43 C.F.R. pt. 12 (2014); 25 C.F.R. pt. 276 (2014). 
 410. Hobbs, Straus, Dean & Walker, General Memorandum 13-101 (Nov. 18, 2013) 
(discussing the attempt by the House Appropriations Interior, Environment, and Related 
Agencies Subcommittee to include language in section 430 of the FY 2012 appropriations 
bill that would have resolved the tribal-federal agencies differences in the 477 Program). The 
federal agencies opposed the change which led to the Appropriations conferees agreement to 
defer consideration of legislation in exchange for agency agreement for the formation of the 
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1574, which was introduced by Senator Lisa Murkowski (R-Alaska) on 
October 16, 2013. Under the proposed amendments, all funds for programs 
and services covered by an approved 477 plan would be transferred to a 
tribe or tribal organization pursuant to an existing contract, compact, or 
funding agreement under ISDEAA, and tribes and tribal organizations 
could combine federal funds for use in performing allowable activities 
authorized under an approved 477 Plan, with no requirement to maintain 
separate records tracing services or activities for audit purposes.411  
The 477 controversy involves some of the same issues, and even 
programs, as the Title VI initiative.412 In both cases, the federal agencies 
wish to retain a grantor-grantee relationship with tribes, as opposed to 
government-to-government relationships under the ISDEAA. The inherent 
tension between tribal self-governance and federal bureaucratic control will 
make it difficult, if not impossible, for tribal and federal representatives to 
agree on the precise contours of new Title VI legislation (or the 477 fix). 
Congress is well aware of this tension, however, and can resolve any 
deadlocks.  
Despite likely DHHS opposition, tribes will no doubt press forward with 
another Title VI bill and legislative 477 fix. Direct tribal operation of non-
IHS DHHS programs, such as TANF and Head Start, would be a major 
achievement, yet should also be relatively non-controversial. The DHHS's 
own study demonstrates the feasibility of the Title VI demonstration 
project, limiting the agency's ability to obstruct proposed legislation 
without appearing unreasonable. And as the Senate recognized ten years 
ago, Title VI represents simply the next logical step in the “evolution in 
tribal self-governance.”413  
  
                                                                                                                 
“P.L. 102-477 Administrative Flexibility Work Group” which included policy and program 
representatives from the tribes and DOI, HHS, DOL, and OMB. After two years of meetings 
and negotiations, the “Flexibility” group did not reach any agreement on these issues). The 
agencies have apparently dropped the proposed funding change and will continue to transfer 
funds through the ISDEAA, and have proposed reporting requirements by “functional 
category” based on expenditures under tribal 477 Plans. See 79 Fed. Reg. 8985 (Feb. 14, 
2014).  
 411. Id. at 2. 
 412. 477 programs also identified in the Title VI feasibility study and included as part of 
the proposed demonstration program include TANF, the Child Care and Development Fund, 
and Native Employment Works. 
 413. S. REP. NO. 108-412, at 2 (2004). 
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E. Expansion of Self-Governance Beyond the DOI and the DHHS 
The logical culmination of tribal self-governance as a statutory 
relationship is to bring tribes' relationships with every government agency 
under a single ISDEAA compact. That is, every agency that operates 
PFSAs with Indians as significant beneficiaries would be authorized to 
compact a tribe's share of those PFSAs and associated funding upon tribal 
request.   
Candidates for such programs abound. Even a cursory look at other 
Cabinet level Departments and executive agencies in the federal 
government reveals opportunities for further ISDEAA expansion, 
particularly with established programs on which tribes rely to protect their 
ancestral homelands and/or for the efficient operation of tribal government. 
While not by any means an exhaustive list, the following examples 
demonstrate some of the immediate opportunities within the federal 
government for the expansion of tribal self-governance under the ISDEAA. 
1. Department of Transportation  
Tribal representatives have long advocated establishing a self-
governance program within the Department of Transportation (DOT), either 
via an amendment to Title IV414 or as part of a broader highway 
reauthorization bill.415 The 2005 highway bill, SAFETEA-LU,416 authorized 
tribal governments to enter into agreements directly with the Secretary of 
Transportation “in accordance with the [ISDEAA].”417 Some DOT officials 
interpreted this language to mean that the agreements must be consistent 
with the ISDEAA, but are not really ISDEAA agreements; consequently the 
DOT has refused to include standard Title IV provisions in their 
agreements. This erroneous interpretation generated a great deal of 
confusion and disagreement over the extent to which Title IV applies to 
                                                                                                                 
 414. E.g., Dep't of the Interior Tribal Self-Governance Act of 2007: Hearings on H.R. 
3996 Before the House Committee on Natural Resources, 110th Cong. 5-7 (2007) (statement 
of W. Ron Allen); id. at 5-6 (statement of Melanie Benjamin). Both tribal leaders quote the 
proposed section 419, which would have established a tribal self-governance program in 
DOT, and explain its rationale, in their testimony. Id. at 5-7. 
 415. See American Energy and Infrastructure Jobs Act of 2012, H.R. 7, 112th Cong., § 
1506 (establishing “Tribal Transportation Self-Governance Program” in DOT). This 
provision was not included in the Senate version of the highway bill that was eventually 
enacted, as discussed infra. 
 416. Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for 
Users, Pub. L. No. 109-59, 119 Stat. 1144 (2005). 
 417. 23 U.S.C. § 202(b)(7)(A) (2012). 
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those agreements. Meanwhile, although SAFETEA-LU expanded tribes’ 
ability to directly access the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) program 
for tribes to widen public transportation services on Indian reservations,418 
Congress did not extend the ISDEAA to the Tribal Transit Program. In its 
rulemaking process, despite numerous tribal comments, the FTA refused to 
consider developing a tribal transit grant agreement modeled on ISDEAA 
grant agreements.419 
On July 6, 2012, President Obama signed into law the first long-term 
highway authorization enacted since 2005: the Moving Ahead for Progress 
in the 21st Century Act.420 MAP-21, as it is known, has brought increased 
funding for surface transportation programs, including over $105 billion for 
FYs 2013 and 2014 across the entire transportation budget.421 It has also 
made several changes that are specific to tribes, including a shift from what 
was previously referred to as the Indian Reservation Roads (IRR) program 
to the more broadly defined “Tribal Transportation Program” under MAP-
21.422 Although tribes have repeatedly proven themselves capable of 
utilizing increased federal transportation infrastructure funds and other 
transportation program services, both the DOT and the DOI have continued 
to resist fully applying the provisions of the ISDEAA to transportation 
programs. MAP-21 did not fix that problem, notwithstanding the efforts of 
tribal leaders to address those concerns. The legislative process that led to 
the authorization of MAP-21 in the House included developing specific 
legislation known as “Section 1506. Tribal Transportation Self-Governance 
Program” as part of House Bill 7, the “American Energy and Infrastructure 
Act of 2012.”423 This proposed legislation was included in the House of 
Representatives’ transportation legislation as part of House Resolution 547, 
but it was not included in the Senate bill, nor was it enacted into law as part 
of MAP-21. The proposed language in House Bill 7’s section 1506 would 
have removed any ongoing doubt that the negotiation and implementation 
of tribal funding agreements with the DOT would be governed by Title IV, 
                                                                                                                 
 418. 49 U.S.C. § 5311(c) (2012). 
 419. See FTA, Public Transportation on Indian Reservations Program; Tribal Transit 
Program, 71 FED. REG. 46,959, 46,962 (Aug. 15, 2006). 
 420. Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act or MAP-21, Pub. L. No. 112-
141, 126 Stat. 405 (2012). 
 421. Office of Policy & Governmental Affairs, Fed. Highway Admin, Map-21: A 
Summary of Highway Provisions 1 (July 17, 2012), available at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ 
map21/docs/map21_summary_hgwy_provisions.pdf.  
 422. 23 U.S.C. § 202.  
 423. See generally H. REP. NO. 112-397 (2012). 
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including a requirement that any secretarial interpretation of federal law 
should facilitate the inclusion of PFSAs (and associated funding) within 
fully implemented self-governance compacts and AFAs.424 
As of this writing, though, the need for the extension of self-governance 
to the DOT is made even clearer by the implementation of MAP-21 by the 
DOT and the BIA. On May 12, 2012, the Office of the Inspector General 
(OIG) of the DOT commenced an analysis of the Tribal Transportation 
Program that continued until August 2013.425 The OIG analysis was cursory 
and limited to data-gathering from very few tribes, but nonetheless it 
concluded, in part, that greater oversight and more comprehensive access to 
remedial actions are warranted for tribes not meeting program 
requirements.426 Unfortunately, federal opposition to the expansion of tribal 
self-governance over transportation programs was reflected in initial draft 
regulations shared by the agencies during tribal consultations in 2013 and 
intended to implement the tribal provisions in MAP-21.427 Tribes are 
prepared to work diligently to share more representative examples of 
successful tribal transportation programs with the DOT and coordinate 
efforts so that the MAP-21 rulemaking results in regulations that are 
consistent with the ISDEAA. When the next major highway reauthorization 
occurs (expected in FY 2015), tribes will be prepared once again to make 
the case for the extension of self-governance within the DOT. 
2. Department of Justice 
The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) plays a very important 
federal role with respect to tribes given primary federal jurisdiction over 
Indian lands and people, as well as ongoing law enforcement 
responsibilities that are a function of that federal jurisdiction.428 In 2010, 
                                                                                                                 
 424. H.R. 7, § 1506 (proposed section 207(j)). 
 425. Office of Inspector Gen., Fed. Highway Admin., Opportunities Exist to Strengthen 
FHWA’s Coordination, Guidance, and Oversight of the Tribal Transportation Program, 
Rept. No. MH 2014-003 (Oct. 2013), available at http://flh.fhwa.dot.gov/programs/ttp/docu 
ments/oig-audit-report.pdf.   
 426. Id. at 10. 
 427. See U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs: Tribal Consultation on the 
Draft Regulations Governing the Tribal Transportation Program, 78 Fed. Reg. 21861, 21861 
(Apr. 12, 2013) (describing dates, locations, and purpose of tribal consultation on proposed 
regulations for 25 C.F.R. Part 170). 
 428. See, e.g., New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334 (1983) (“State 
jurisdiction is preempted by the operation of federal law if it interferes or is incompatible 
with federal and tribal interests reflected in federal law, unless the State interests at stake are 
sufficient to justify the assertion of State authority.”) 
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recognizing the wide range of programs that impacted Indian tribes and 
Alaskan Natives, as well as the complexity of having tribes access those 
programs on an ongoing basis, the DOJ created the Coordinated Tribal 
Assistance Solicitation (CTAS).429 In FY 2014, the CTAS offers eligible 
tribes the opportunity, through a single application, to request funding from 
nine distinct programs within the DOJ: public safety and community 
policing; comprehensive planning for justice systems; tribal courts 
assistance in alcohol and substance abuse prevention programs; corrections 
and corrections alternatives; violence against women; violence against 
children; crime victims assistance programs; juvenile justice; and tribal 
youth prevention programs.430  
While this departmental coordination within the DOJ allowing for the 
effective administration of grant-funded programs impacting Indian 
Country is a step in the right direction, at least one major analysis of the 
DOJ has found that it does not go far enough.431 One of the most important 
and comprehensive reports ever on justice in Indian Country was released 
by the Indian Law and Order Commission (Commission) in November 
2013.432 Among many excellent recommendations for improving law and 
order in Indian Country, the Commission identified the need for the 
potential expansion of the ISDEAA within the DOJ.433 Citing the lack of 
collaboration and cooperation between BIA law enforcement and DOJ 
programs, the Commission recommended consolidating these functions 
within a new agency in the DOJ and allowing tribes to contract with that 
agency under the ISDEAA.434 “Some of these problems could be resolved if 
Tribal governments were able to access DOJ Indian country resources via 
[Title I] contracts, self-governance compacts, or P.L. 102-477 funding 
agreements, all of which allow Tribal governments to take over 
management of Federal funds.”435 This call for extending the ISDEAA to 
the DOJ makes sense, especially in the context of the Commission’s 
                                                                                                                 
 429. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COORDINATED TRIBAL ASSISTANCE SOLICITATION FOR FY 
2014 FACT SHEET (2014). 
 430. Id. at 3. 
 431. See generally INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N, A ROADMAP FOR MAKING NATIVE 
AMERICA SAFER (Nov. 2013) [hereinafter ROADMAP]. 
 432. Id.  The Indian Law and Order Commission is a federal commission that was 
created by Congress with the passage of the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010. See 
generally 25 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2815 (2012). 
 433. ROADMAP, supra note 431, at 87. 
 434. Id. at 85, 87, 89. 
 435. Id. at 87. 
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emphasis throughout the Report on the need to empower local tribal 
communities to take control of and accountability for law enforcement.436  
3. Department of Agriculture 
As with other cabinet level departments, the Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) has a wide range of programs and activities that directly impact 
tribes and Indian lands. Recent legislation points to one specific example of 
a USDA program where ISDEAA expansion is the logical next step: 
implementation of the Tribal Forest Protection Act of 2004.437 The Tribal 
Forest Protection Act essentially authorizes the Secretaries of Agriculture 
and the Interior to give special consideration to tribally proposed 
Stewardship Contracting (or other projects) on Forest Service and Bureau 
of Land Management (BLM) land bordering or adjacent to Indian trust land 
in order to protect Indian trust resources from fire, disease, or other threats 
arising from the Forest Service or BLM land.438 
The Tribal Forest Protection Act has some similarities to the ISDEAA 
structurally, including similar eligibility criteria, delineation of how and 
why proposals can be declined, and reports back to Congress on 
implementation.439 However, there is no specific authorization of funding or 
right to funding, and the Act does not reference the ISDEAA as an 
appropriate authority for agreements or incorporate its other protections. In 
order for the USDA to fully implement the Tribal Forest Protection Act of 
2004, it would be logical for Congress to extend to that Act all of the 
ISDEAA’s provisions and protections, such as FTCA coverage. 
4. Department of Homeland Security 
Various Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agencies and 
programs impact tribes and tribal lands. Recent amendments to the Stafford 
Act, through provisions contained in the Sandy Relief Act of 2012, provide 
tribes expanded authority to administer various Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) programs.440 Tribes now have the capacity 
                                                                                                                 
 436. See, e.g., id. at 23-24 (recommending that Congress allow tribes to “opt out” of 
federal Indian country criminal jurisdiction and/or congressionally authorized state 
jurisdiction, except for federal laws of general application, and “recognize the Tribe’s 
inherent criminal jurisdiction”); id. at 43-44 (discussing Alaska communities where, often, 
tribes constitute the only day-to-day governmental presence). 
 437. See generally 25 U.S.C. §§ 3115a (2012). 
 438. Id. § 3115a(a)(4), (b)(1), (c)(1)-(3). 
 439. Id. § 3115a(c), (d), (g). 
 440. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121–5207 (2012).  
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to work with FEMA directly, rather than through state government, in 
declaring national emergencies on tribal lands, seeking assistance to address 
damage from emergencies, and carrying out hazard mitigation planning 
activities to mitigate or prevent future emergencies on tribal lands.441  
These programs and activities are a logical point for expansion of the 
ISDEAA, as the intent of these new tribal authorities within the Stafford 
Act is to increase tribal self-determination and sovereignty in the face of 
crisis and disaster. Congress should consider allowing tribes to utilize the 
familiar contractual, legal, and funding mechanisms of the ISDEAA during 
a disaster, when FEMA support and funding are needed, by extending the 
ISDEAA to its recent expansion of tribal rights under the Stafford Act. 
5. Environmental Protection Agency 
Since 1993, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has provided 
support to federally recognized tribes to build internal environmental 
program capacity through its Indian General Assistance Program (IGAP).442 
The importance of the EPA IGAP program in Indian Country cannot be 
overstated, as it provides many tribes, particularly small tribes, with much-
needed financial support without which these tribes would not have an 
environmental program. In its recent IGAP guidance, the EPA explained 
that its OIG had examined the efficacy of the IGAP in 2008, and found that 
it lacked uniform implementation nationally.443 It suggested, in part, that the 
EPA should “[r]evise how IGAP funding is distributed to tribes to place 
more emphasis on tribes’ prior progress, environmental capacity needs, and 
long-term goals.”444  
The over-arching goal of the IGAP is to build tribal capacity, and the 
ultimate ends of tribal capacity are self-determination and self-governance. 
The EPA IGAP is a logical opportunity for ISDEAA expansion within the 
EPA, as the IGAP provides tribes the opportunity to identify internal tribal 
programmatic needs from year to year, with the goal of self-directed tribal 
leadership to meet those needs through program administration. Through 
                                                                                                                 
 441. See FEMA, Frequently Asked Questions: Process for Tribal Governments to Request 
a Presidential Declaration (Oct. 2013, available at http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/ 
1383332744585-e4c4534105a89fc66ff397216e39afb7/FAQs%20-%20Declaration%20Reque 
st%20Process%20for%20Tribal%20Governments.pdf. 
 442. See EPA, GUIDANCE ON THE AWARD AND MANAGEMENT OF GENERAL ASSISTANCE 
AGREEMENTS FOR TRIBES AND INTERTRIBAL CONSORTIA at iii-iv (2013), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/tribal/GAP-guidance-final.pdf (regarding “Final Guidance on the Award 
and Management of General Assistance Agreements for Tribes and Intertribal Consortia”). 
 443. Id. at 14. 
 444. Id. at iv. 
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tribal-EPA consultation, the ISDEAA could be extended to the IGAP, and 
potentially other EPA programs,445 to simultaneously advance tribal 
environmental health and administrative capacity. 
6. Department of Defense 
In the Department of Defense (DOD), there are a wide range of programs 
that impact tribes. There are many instances where the extension of the 
ISDEAA would be a logical next step. For example, Congress has, since 
1993, inserted a provision in the DOD Appropriations Act requiring the 
DOD to devote funds annually to mitigate its environmental impacts to 
Indian lands and lands conveyed under the Alaskan Native Claims 
Settlement Act (ANCSA).446 The Native American Lands Environmental 
Mitigation Program (NALEMP) has generally administered from $8-10 
million per year, mitigating DOD damage to tribal lands.447 A number of 
tribes have utilized this program to identify problem areas created by the 
DOD and clean up their ancestral homelands. However, the agreement 
structure for the NALEMP program has centered around DOD-defined 
Memoranda of Agreement (MOAs) and Cooperative Agreements rather 
than extending the provisions of the ISDEAA to allow tribes greater 
programmatic management and oversight over these efforts.448  
These are merely a small illustrative listing of logical programs for 
potential extension of the ISDEAA further beyond the DOI and the DHHS. 
One challenge will be the tendency of federal agencies to leave grant 
programs, and grant funding, under strict regulatory schemes and limited 
program guidance. Another challenge will be to help agencies overcome 
their tendency to see their funding agreements with tribes as merely sole-
source procurement contracts, rather than true self-determination 
agreements.449 As Congress has recognized, however, these government-to-
                                                                                                                 
 445. Under various federal environmental laws, Indian tribes are treated as states for the 
purposes of implementing elements of broad regulatory schemes, including the Clean Water 
Act (CWA), Clean Air Act (CAA), Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), Toxic Substances 
Control Act (TSCA), and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). 
Consideration should also be given to extending the ISDEAA to the funding mechanisms 
associated with these “treatment as state” programs for tribes. 
 446. E.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, 128 Stat. 5, 111-
12 (appropriating $12 million for mitigation of environmental impacts on Indian lands 
resulting from DOD activities).   
 447. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, NALEMP IMPLEMENTATION MANUAL 2 (Apr. 2005). 
 448. Id. at 8. 
 449. King, supra note 244, at 524-25 (describing National Park Service view of self-
governance through lens of procurement contracting).  
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government agreements are akin to solemn treaties as well as ordinary 
contracts:  
Treaties are a significant part of the legal relationship between 
Indian tribes and the United States. Self-governance, by its use 
of compacts, another traditional contracting device used between 
governments, is designed to honor the government-to-
government relationship and remind the parties to these 
agreements of the historical basis for their relationship.450  
V. Conclusion: Self-Governance in an Evolving Political Context  
Our focus has been on self-governance as a statutory right of federally 
recognized tribes, under the ISDEAA, to administer federal programs for 
their own people according to their own priorities. The ISDEAA and the 
many contracts and compacts it has spawned over the years have helped 
further the movement away from pervasive federal control and towards 
tribal autonomy. The ISDEAA, however, is only one aspect of a larger 
movement toward tribal self-rule in economic and political spheres. 
Contracting and compacting federal programs brings jobs to tribal 
communities and builds tribal administrative capacity, but tribes also 
exercise self-determination through economic development, cultural 
activity, language revitalization, and other aspects of nation-building. There 
is no doubt that the federal policy of self-determination in general, and the 
ISDEAA in particular, have played a significant role in strengthening tribal 
governments and communities over the past forty years.451 Conversely, as 
tribes experience more success exercising their sovereignty in a variety of 
contexts, this larger movement can be expected to drive changes in Title IV, 
Title V, and future self-governance statutes.  
The evolving political context within which tribal self-governance itself 
evolves is largely beyond tribal control. For now, the traditional bipartisan 
support in Congress for Indian self-determination is largely intact, but some 
observers see that bipartisanship eroding as conservatives move away from 
the libertarian themes exemplified in President Nixon’s 1970 address.452 If 
tribal self-governance becomes identified solely as a Democratic or liberal 
                                                                                                                 
 450. H.R. REP. NO. 106-477, at 17 (1999), reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. 573, 575.  
 451. See generally Cornell & Kalt, supra note 6, at 12-16 (“[T]he overall pattern of 
results [from tribal self-determination] in Indian Country is quite positive, and the reasons lie 
in the facts that local decision making and administration (1) improve accountability and (2) 
allow on-the-ground programs and policies to better reflect local values.”). 
 452. Id. at 18, 27 (discussing President Nixon’s address on tribal self-determination). 
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cause, the legislative reforms and advances discussed above will become 
much more difficult to achieve. Tribal leaders have long been successful in 
tying self-governance to larger federal policy initiatives, both conservative 
and liberal, from the civil rights movement of the 1960s, to the 
“devolution” of social programs from federal to state and local control in 
the 1980s and 1990s, to the current “wars” on drugs and terrorism.453 But 
one thing is certain: whatever particular legislative and administrative 
forms and vehicles tribal self-governance takes in the future, it is, and will 
remain, a fundamental right under United States and international law.454  
  
                                                                                                                 
 453. Kevin K. Washburn, Tribal Self-Determination at the Crossroads, 38 CONN. L. REV. 
777, 795-96 (2006) (citation omitted) (quoting Harry N. Scheiber, Redesigning the 
Architecture of Federalism—An American Tradition: Modern Devolution Policies in 
Perspective, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 227 (1996)). 
 454. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text. 
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